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In a sonnet, "To His Son,"' Sir Walter Ralegh commented on the
death penalty:
Three things there be that prosper all apace
And flourish, while they are asunder far;
But on a day they meet all in a place,
And when they meet, they one another mar.
And they be these: the wood, the weed, the wag.
The wood is that that makes the gallows tree;
The weed is that that strings the hangman's bag;
The wag, my pretty knave, betokens thee.
Now mark, dear boy: while these assemble not,
Green springs the tree, hemp grows, the wag is wild;
But when they meet, it makes the timber rot,
It frets the halter, and it chokes the child.
God Bless the Child!
Introduction
For Ralegh, the irony was that the execution ensued from the
conflux of three vital things, which were unto themselves quite innocuous. In the broadest sense, however, the English Renaissance bard
realized that anatomizing the painful inscrutability of a hanging could
bring about some relief in the form of understanding. Had the United
States Supreme Court in its recent death penalty decision, Harris v.
Alabama,2 reduced the capital sentencing scheme at issue to its three
components, 3 it, in all likelihood, would have pronounced it unconstitutional for judges to impose death after juries return an advisory life
verdict.
In thirty-three of the thirty-seven capital punishment states, juries
play a part in the sentencing decision. 4 In all but four of these thirtythree "death states"-namely, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, and Delaware-the jury's verdict is final.' Under a sentencing statute such as
1. Sir Walter Ralegh, To His Son, in PoErnY oF THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE 138,139
(J. William Hebel & Hoyt H. Hudson eds., 1957).
2. 115 S.Ct. 1031 (1995).
3. The three components, as described below, are the excision of the tympanic membrane, augmented death bias, and annihilation of the only safeguard.
4. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The four states in which the judge alone is
authorized to decide life or death are Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp.
1994)), Idaho (IDAHo CODE § 19-2515 (1995)), Montana (MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-103,
301 (1993)), and Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2522 (1994)). In Nevada (NEv. ZEv.
STAT. ANN. § 175.556 (Michie 1993)), a three judge panel makes the decision if the jury
cannot reach an agreement.
5. See Harris, 115 S.Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The override statutes are
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(3) (West 1994), IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (Burns 1995), DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 11, § 4209(d) (Supp. 1994);
see also Michael L. Radelet & Michael Meilo, Death-To-Life Overrides: Saving the Re-
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Alabama's, at issue in Harris,a judge can override the jury's advisory
6
life verdict and impose the death sentence.
The Harris decision is not the first in which the Supreme Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to a capital sentencing statute with
an override provision. In a seminal 1976 death penalty case, Proffit v.
Florida,7 the petitioner contended that the statutory guidelines failed

to adequately prescribe how the judge was to weigh the jury's advisory
verdict. 8 What Proffit involved, however, was not a disagreement between the judge and jury, but a situation where the judge sentenced
the defendant to death after the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending death.
Later, Spaziano v. Florida9 presented the Supreme Court with
the discordant situation in which a judge rejected a jury life recommendation and imposed death. In a six to three decision, the Court
determined that such an override scheme was constitutionally valid
and did not violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 10
sources of the FloridaSupreme Court,20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 196, 196 (1992); Katheryn K.
Russell, The ConstitutionalityofJury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases,46 ALA. L.
REv. 5, 9-10 (1994).

6.

ALA. CODE

§ 13A-5-47(e) (1994).

7. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
8. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Proffit concluded that the Florida death penalty
procedures satisfy the requisites of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Proffit, 425
U.S. at 253. According to the Proffit decision, the Florida procedures gave trial judges
specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or imprisonment for life. Id. Also, the decisions are reviewed to ensure that they
comport with other sentences imposed under similar circumstances. Id Further, the Court
concluded that the aggravating circumstances, as construed by the Florida Supreme Court,
provided adequate guidance to the sentencers and the statute gave clear and precise directions to enable both the judge and jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigators. Id. at 251. The Proffit Court, moreover, said capital judges had more capital
sentencing experience than juries and thus were better qualified to make the decision. Id.
at 252. But see Russell, supra note 5, at 12 n.59 ("Ironically, a 1980 study of Florida judges
showed that the average trial judge had made only three capital sentencing decisions during the seven and one-half years encompassing the post-Furman period.").
9. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
10. Id. at 457-64. The Spaziano Court stated:
In light of the facts that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury sentencing,
that the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases do not require it, and
that neither the nature of, nor the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury
sentencing, we cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to
impose the sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional.
Id at 464; see also infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text.
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A common denominator in the Supreme Court's reasons for validating Florida's jury override scheme has been its explicit approval of
a safeguard, known as the Tedder standard,11 which requires a Florida
sentencing judge to accord "great weight 1 2 to the jury verdict. 13 Specifically, the Tedder standard prevents a trial judge from overriding a
jury's life verdict unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are]
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."1 The Spaziano Court, acknowledging the Tedder safeguard as
"significant," expressed its "satis[faction] that the Florida Supreme
Court takes that standard seriously and has not hesitated to reverse a
trial court if it derogates the jury's role."'
Despite the Supreme Court's consistent praise of the Tedder protection, Alabama courts have persisted in their refusal to engraft a
Tedder or Tedder-like safeguard onto their own override statute. 6
This difference between the Alabama and Florida capital sentencing
11. The Tedder standard comes from the decision in Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908
(Fla. 1975); see infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
12. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
13. See Proffit, 428 U.S. at 249 (holding Tedder to be more than an adequate safeguard); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465 (praising Tedder standard); see also Parker v. Dugger,
498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991) (emphasizing that Tedder is a "crucial protection").
14. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910; see infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
15. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465; see infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., ExparteJones, 456 So. 2d 380,382 (Ala. 1984) (declining to adopt Tedder,
which is not "a general constitutional requirement"); Giles v. State, 632 So. 2d 568, 573
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (argument that a Tedder standard should be adopted "has been
decided adversely to the appellant on numerous occasions"). The two other override
states, Delaware and Indiana, have standards similar to Alabama's. See, e.g., Pennell v.
State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377-78 (Del. 1992) (finding Tedder analysis "didactic," and concluding that record supported judge's sentence); Martinez Chavez v. State, 539 N.E.2d 4, 5
(Ind. 1989) ("[Sltandard by which the jury's recommendation would be accorded a presumption of correctness... was derived from... Tedder."); Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d
1047, 1070 (Ind. 1983) ("Any standard of less stringency [than Tedder] detracts from the
jury's contribution to the sentencing decision .... ").
Significantly, at the time of the writing of this Article, there was a bill on the Florida
Governor's desk, which if signed would have done away with Florida's Tedder safeguard.
The bill provided:
Following the return of the jury's nonbinding advisory recommendation, the court
shall make an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine the appropriate sentence. The nonbinding advisory recommendation shall be used solely for the purpose of apprising the trial judge and
appellate court of the jury's reaction to the evidence of aggravation and mitigation as a matter of information. Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death ....
Fla. HB 1319 (1995). The Governor, however, vetoed the bill.
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procedures 17 that became the Supreme Court's primary focus in Harris, in which the Court concluded that "the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution [did not] require[ ] the sentencing judge8 to ascribe any
particular weight to the verdict of an advisory jury.'
What the HarrisCourt did not mention, however, were two other
aspects of the jury override scheme, both of which when combined
with the third-the absence of the Tedder safeguard-make an Alabama judge's override of a jury life verdict an effectually murderous
anathema. In addition, what the Court reiterated set off a seductive
non sequitur by creating an ostensibly logical ligature between its precept that "the Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to
impose a capital sentence," and its conclusion that "[the Constitution]
is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing
judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give
it proper weight."' "9 As this Article proposes, such reasoning can
guarantee the occurrence of executions after a jury has determined
that a death sentence is an overwhelmingly inappropriate result.
This Article further argues that a capital sentencing statute allowing a judge to sentence a defendant to death after a jury returns a
life verdict is an intolerably pernicious procedure. Part I of this Article contains a condensed discussion of the importance of the jury in a
criminal proceeding and its special function in the capital sentencing
phase. It suggests that the policies underlying jury participation in the
determination of life or death transcend what are the basic objectives
of having juries serve as the decisionmakers in criminal trials. Juries
as capital sentencers do more than merely serve to preserve societal
faith in the criminal justice system, afford individuals some participation in democratic decisionmaking, or provide a shield from arbitrary
governmental oppression.2 ° In pronouncing a capital sentence, the
jury also does more than just serve as "the conscience of the community, '21 or express "society's moral outrage at particular offensive
conduct."'
17. If the Florida Governor had not vetoed the bill, which the Legislature had passed
right after the Harris decision, the Alabama and Florida capital sentencing procedures
would have been somewhat similar.
18. Harris,115 S. Ct. at 1034.
19. Id. at 1037.
20. See infra notes 29-74 and accompanying text.
21. Anne B. Poulin, The Jury: The CriminalJusticeSystem's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN.

L. REv. 1377, 1392-97 (1994); see infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); see infra note 46 and accompanying

text.
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As described in Part I, the capital sentencing jury acts as the tympanic membrane. 23 In this capacity, the jurors receive the most feasibly complete narrative of a defendant literally fighting for life. As
such, the capital sentencing phase of the trial is designed to expose the
jury to the most unredacted version of information about the individual defendant and convey the whole of what occurred in the language
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The mitigators, both
statutory and nonstatutory, are purposefully broad so as to encompass
a whole range of compelling information about the particular defendant and other details surrounding the crime. Thus, as participants in
capital sentencing, the jury functions as the proper auditor of the defendant's life noises, and out of the defendant's mitigative amalgam,
returns a verdict of life or death. Part I also contains a description of
the real devastation that occurs when a judge trumps a jury life verdict
with the death penalty, an act metaphorically equated with the excision of the tympanic membrane.
Part II seemingly detours to an analysis of the reasoning in Caldwell v. Mississippi,24 in which the Supreme Court recognized the unconstitutionality of allowing the death sentencer to believe that
someone else is really responsible for determining the appropriateness
of death. Of special concern to the Caldwell Court was that such a
sense of diminished responsibility creates a death-biased jury, which,
in turn, could result in executions when the sentencer
never actually
25
concluded that death was the appropriate sentence.
From there, I rely preliminarily on the analysis of Professor
Mello, who applies Caldwell to jury override statutes, and asserts
"[t]he danger of bias and unreliability that may stem from a diminished sense of sentencing responsibility remains just as great when a
jury is told that the trial judge will review and make the ultimate sentencing decision."26 This section then advances the position that jury
override statutes do not spawn mere death bias, but actually augment
death bias.
23. The tympanic membrane "closes externally the cavity of the middle ear and functions in the mechanical reception of sound waves and in their transmission to the site of
sensory reception." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICnONARY 1277 (9th ed. 1988). I
employ the tympanic membrane as a metaphor in connection with my discussion of the
jury's role.
24. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
25. Id. at 331-32.
26. Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionalityof
CapitalStatutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L.
REv.283, 297 (1989).
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In connection with an analysis of augmented death bias and
stressing the special significance of the issuance of a jury life verdict in
spite of an augmented death bias, this Article then defines the cataclysmic consequences of a trial judge scrapping such life advice. Specifically, what I suggest is that such augmented death bias, built right
into a jury override system, does not just pose what the Caldwell
Court saw as the potential danger of an improper execution. Rather,
what augmented death bias does is guarantee the very occurrence of
the Caldwell horror: the death botch.
Part III explores the significance of the Tedder standard, which
requires a trial judge to give "great weight"2 7 to the jury recommendation, and discusses the tribute historically paid by the Supreme Court
to the Tedder standard. The core of Part III, however, is the contention that in the context of statutorily authorized judicial overrides of
jury life recommendations, Tedder is not simply important, but is in
fact, the only saving grace. Essentially, the kind of deference that
Tedder compels judges to accord to advisory jury verdicts ministers to
the capital sentencing jury not only the constitutionally assigned role
as the community's "conscience" or voice of "outrage," but also as the
tympanic membrane. It is here that I suggest that the Tedder constraint can become the only iota of amelioration when an advisory
jury returns a life verdict, which, in an augmentedly death-biased system, is nearly miraculous. Part I-l is thus an attempt to disclose the
disturbing ramifications of such an override system without a Tedder
safeguard.
Part IV then delves into the Supreme Court's recent Harrisdecision and identifies the dangers inherent in the Court's conclusion that
"the Eighth Amendment... [does not] require[ ] the sentencing judge
to ascribe any particular weight to the verdict of the advisory jury. ' ' 8
What I submit in this context is that the HarrisCourt has done what is
conceivably worse than legitimizing state murder. By upholding Alabama's capital sentencing scheme, the Court has condoned the annihilation of the only protection, the Tedder standard, in an arena of
augmented death bias and in so doing, has effectually excised the tympanic membrane. As such, the Harris decision is, in truth, the
Supreme Court's imprimatur on the convergence of three of the most
toxic capital sentencing phenomena. As I will show, the effect will be
to encourage improper executions and ultimately disparage human
life.
27. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
28. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1034.
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This Article's conclusion partially reverts to its beginning by expanding Ralegh's sonnet into a conceit. Through this, I explore the
consequences of such a convergence of three things that, unlike
Ralegh's, are quite noxious unto themselves: the excision of the tympanic membrane, augmented death bias, and an annihilation of the
sole Tedder safeguard.
I.

The Excision of the Tympanic Membrane

As Alexander Hamilton noted, the right to a jury trial was one of
the few points of agreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists at the 1787 Constitutional Convention:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they
agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon
the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it
consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to
liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government. 29
In fact, the twelve states that already had written constitutions
before the Constitutional Convention all guaranteed a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial.30 The United States Constitution of
1789 enumerated that same jury guarantee, which was one of few included in both the original document and Bill of Rights.3 '
The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to
trial by "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed. ' 32 Under Duncan v. Louisiana, states
cannot abridge this fundamental right.33 Built into the Sixth Amendment guarantee and the historical safeguarding of the right to an impartial jury is a basic awareness that a jury is not only the "conscience

29. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
30. See generally Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the
CriminalJury in the United States, 61 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 867, 870 & n.15 (1994).
31. See id at 870 & nn.12-13.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan, who was charged and convicted of simple battery,
requested a jury trial. The request was denied and Duncan was convicted. Id. at 146.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the denial of such a request violated Duncan's
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Id. at 149-50.
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3 but also essential to society's faith in our crimiof the community,"
35
nal justice system.
Further, the jury is, of course, an avenue for individual participation in democratic decisionmaking 36 and likewise serves as a shield
against arbitrary governmental oppression. 7 In Duncan,the Supreme
Court elaborated on the preeminent role of the jury in our criminal
justice system:

A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to

prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to

eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice

of higher authority.... Providing an accused with the right to be

tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge ....[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamen-

tal decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to

34. See Poulin, supra note 21, at 1392-97; see also Jeremy W. Barber, The Jury Is Still
Out: The Role of Jury Science in the Modem American Courtroom, 31 AM. CraM. L. REV.
1225, 1228-29 (1994) ("[The definition of community is malleable; for example, a defendant who was raised in poverty in a broken home may be entitled to a jury composed of
others from the same background. The Supreme Court has rejected this notion, but the
expansive reading is not an implausible construction of 'peer' or 'community."').
35. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURE: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 32 (1977) (asserting the underrepresentation of minorities on juries makes minorities mistrust the criminal justice system). Cf. Alschuler &
Deiss, supra note 30, at 868 ("Our central theme is that as the jury's composition became
more democratic, its role in American civic life declined.").
36. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("Community participation
in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system."); see also IhROSas FUKURAI ET Al., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DIsENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 3 (1993) ("The jury is one of our most
democratic institutions."); Barber, supra note 34, at 1230 ("The infusion of laymen into the
criminal justice system legitimizes the administration of justice and bolsters democracy. It
counters .the professional desensitization that is inevitable in those who confront the criminal justice system daily."); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth
Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures,64 N.C. L. REv. 501, 512 (1986) (discussing
the role of juries in criminal trials).
37. Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REv. 808, 826 (1989);
see also Daniel W. Van Ness, PreservingA Community Voice: The Case For Half-And-Half
Juries In Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1994)
("While the Court has frequently held that the function of the jury is to protect the defendant from oppressive governmental authority, the Court has also recognized the other roles
as necessary, appropriate, and compatible with protecting the defendant's rights.").
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entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to
one judge or to a group of judges.3"
Such language in Duncan amounts to a tribute to the jury as an emblem of democracy with its potential interdiction of the evils that ensue from an undue concentration of power in the hands of one or
few. 39

Some purposeful inexactitude is another aspect of the jury system. Judge Higginbotham touches upon this in his description of how
"black box" decisions are uniquely the province of the jury:
While certain decisions must be made, yea or nay, the choice is

not easily defended by rational exposition. To the contrary, the
decisions can be no more than the collective hunch of the jury.
This is the soul of decision making by juries, and it is inevitably
discretionary in the sense that it is beyond the reach of jury instructions and other such devices designed to restrain or guide
the jury's discretion. These decisions are by necessity black box
calls. The only check upon this core power of irreducible discretion is the jury's representative character. By drawing persons
from the populace and vesting them with powers over the lib-

erty of others and maintaining their anonymity, we draw upon
the jury's ability to mirror the community's values and

attitudes.40
Basically, what Judge Higginbotham describes as the "core power
of irreducible discretion," which can amount to a "collective hunch"
and at times defy "rational exposition," is not a drawback of jury decisionmaking but one of its virtues-namely, its truly human component.41 One legal scholar has argued that our criminal justice system
with its various mechanisms, which "free the jury from accountability
38. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
39. In discussing the struggle between judges and juries over decisionmaking authority, Phoebe Haddon states, "'At a time when judges were dependent instruments of the

crown, a jury of one's peers and neighbors seemed to be a promising bulwark against the
tyrannous enforcement of the law."' Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 29, 41 (1994) (quoting Harold M. Hyman & Catharine M. Tarrant, Aspects
of American TrialJury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
25, 27-28 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975)); see also WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY
JURY (1971) (describing the origins of the American jury); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding
and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1989) (discussing historical antecedents of the right to a jury trial).
40. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
1047, 1051-52 (1991); see also Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" On Life or Death-If
They're Arbitrary,Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge PatrickHigginbotham, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1067 (1991).
41. But there are quite a few critics of the jury system. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEiSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2 (1966) (listing jury critics); see also J. Wilson

Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REv. 483, 495-96 (1985).
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for its verdict"'42 and give it "the power to nullify-that is, the power
to acquit or to convict on reduced charges despite overwhelming evidence against the defendant,14 3 tends to nourish what is human in the
deliberative process. When juries participate in capital sentencing, all
of the salient policies behind the jury system apply, but with even
greater force. Specifically, in capital sentencing, the jury's role as
"conscience of the community"' manifests itself in several ways. As
one commentator has identified, there is a belief, "[e]specially at a
time when capital punishment is hotly debated, [that] a death sentence
should be the determination of a group of twelve lay persons chosen
at random from the widest population."'45' Because death penalty advocates typically justify the sentence as societal retribution, the states
that include juries in the sentencing process envision the representa-

42. See Poulin, supra note 21, at 1398. The rule that jurors are not accountable for
their verdicts dates back to Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (P.C. 1670).
43. Poulin, supra note 21, at 1399. Professor Poulin further states:
It has been argued that our system authorizes jury nullification, in other words,
that the jury has de jure authority to acquit against the law. Even if those arguments are incorrect, the jury has de facto power to nullify. In a criminal trial, the
court cannot direct a verdict of guilty, no matter how strong the evidence. In
addition, if the jury acquits, double jeopardy bars the prosecution from appealing
the verdict or seeking retrial. Similarly, if the jury convicts the defendant of a less
serious offense than the one charged, the prosecution cannot again try the defendant on the more serious charge. This effect occurs regardless of whether the
jury consciously rejects the law, embraces a merciful attitude, or is simply confused concerning the law or facts. Thus, nullification-with or without authority,
intended or not-is part of our system.
Id. at 1399-1400 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[N]ullification can and should serve an important function in
the criminal process ....The drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of
every case where a defendant's conduct is 'unlawful' but not blameworthy, any more than
they can draw a bold line to mark the boundary between an accident and negligence. It is
the jury-as spokesman for the community's sense of values-that must explore that subtle
and elusive boundary."); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 30, at 871-75 (discussing the jury's
role in resisting English authority before the revolution and the case of John Peter
Zenger); Barber, supra note 34, at 1230 ("Through juror nullification, a jury has the power
to mitigate some of the harshness of the numb, professional administration of justice and
to provide some clemency and mercy."); Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CrM.L. Rnv.
239, 241 (1993) (arguing "judges can and should exercise their discretion to allow nullification by flexibly applying the concepts of relevancy and prejudice and by admitting evidence
bearing on moral values").
44. Poulin, supra note 21, at 1392.
45. Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in NoncapitalCases:A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CoNrrEmp. L. 3, 4-5 (1994). But see generally text
accompanying infra notes 125-127 (discussion of death-qualified jurors and WitherspoonWainwright progeny).
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tive cross-section of the community as the rightful vocalizers
of "soci'4 6
ety's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.
In addition, the jury as the shield against oppression, and the basic "reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges,"'47 figure prominently
in capital sentencing to prevent the jaws of the political climate from
mauling a human life. Specifically, trial judges, with their sights on
promotion or on mere prolongation of their tenure, can find themselves currying political favor through demonstrated zeal for the death
penalty.48 Placing the responsibility, however, on the jury can cleanse
personal ambition from life-or-death decisionmaking.
There is still another feature to jury involvement in capital sentencing. Criminal trials, as do all trials, contain narratives. The impressions juries derive from such narratives influence the outcomes of
the trials. One problem that the defense typically faces is how to effectively transmit the accused's story to the decisionmakers. In fact,
sometimes lawyering can deleteriously distort or obfuscate the accused's story.4 9 In a capital trial, for instance, the jury's reactions to
an accused's story can literally make the difference between life or
death. Even when the accused does not take the stand, his or her
46. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (elaborating "the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the
community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous ... that the only.
response may be the penalty of death."); see also Higginbotham, supra note 40, at 1048
(discussing the entanglement of juries and the death penalty and the "choice between a
sentence of life or death" as one "uniquely laden with expressions of anger and retribution
and.., freighted with goals of general and specific deterrence").
47. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; see also SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY 159 (1956)
(discussing the limitations of the judiciary and "[tjhe malady that sooner or later affects
most men of a profession," which is the tendency "to construct a mystique that cuts them
off from the common man"); Paul Mancino, III, Jury Waiver In Capital Cases:An Assessment of the Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Standard, 39 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 605, 611
(1991) (discussing the failure of judges to "speak for the community"); Parker, supra note
41, at 495 (discussing the jury as "the best protection against judicial injustice").
48. See generally Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
49. In this respect, Professor Alfieri's discussion of the "falsifications attending lawyer
storytelling" in poverty law practice serves as a helpful analogue:
My suspicion is that a lawyer's telling of his client's story in advocacy falsifies the
normative content of that story. The normative content of a client's story consists
of substantive narratives which construct the meanings and images of the client's
social world. Both the lawyer and the client speak in narratives. Lawyer storytelling falsifies client story when lawyer narratives silence and displace client
narratives.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991).
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perspective must somehow filter its way to the decisionmakers. Sometimes even where the defendant's story is not particularly compelling,
it may be all the accused has-a whisper of a hope at salvation. Such
defense stories can sometimes create a sense of commonality between
the individual on trial and the decisionmakers. Specifically, images of
the accused's world can even, albeit sometimes seemingly mysteriously, build the semblance of a bridge from the defense table to the
jury box. In a capital case, such a construct can become the very conduit of life.
In the conviction phase of any trial, the legal system can silence
and redact the accused's story. Evidentiary and procedural rules can
exacerbate the problem and have the effect of keeping whole chapters
of the accused's story from the jury. Although the sentencing phase of
a capital trial has its own set of limitations, it is designed to create a
forum in which the defendant's voice is least likely to be muffled or
lost. That proceeding, the one that determines life or death, aspires to
be a realm of least falsification.
Florida's capital sentencing procedure is part of the statute enacted in response to Furman v. Georgia.50 Before Furman, Florida
statutes mandated that all defendants convicted of a capital offense be
sentenced to death unless the trial jury recommended mercy.5 ' That
recommendation of mercy was binding on the trial court.52 According
to the Furman Court, the Eighth Amendment infirmity was that the
statute gave the juries uncontrolled discretion to impose the death
53
penalty.
50. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For discussions of how Florida's statute was an attempt to
accommodate the directives of Furman, see generally Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to
Do Justice: Florida'sJury Override and the State Constitution,18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 924,
927-28 (1991); Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida'sPractice of
Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 35-36 (1985);
Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida,18
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1409, 1410-11 (1985); Radelet & Mello, supra note 5, at 196-99;
Michael L. Radelet & Margaret Vandiver, The FloridaSupreme Court and Death Penalty
Appeals, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 913-14 (1983).
51. Law of July 2, 1970, ch. 136, § 3, 1971 Fla. Laws 554 (repealed 1972); see Law of
July 2, 1970, ch. 339, § 119, 1970 Fla. Laws 1051 (repealed 1972).
52. See eg., Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 101 (1884) ("If a majority of the jurors recommend mercy, by whatever motives they may be actuated, (and these motives are not circumscribed) the court is bound to heed their verdict, and pronounce sentence

accordingly."); see also Garner v. State, 9 So. 835, 847 (Fla. 1891) (applying Newton).
53. Furman,408 U.S. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see generally Marcia A. Widder, HangingLife in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the

Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1341, 1346-48 (1994) (discussion of
Furman).
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Consequently, the post-Furmanenactment constitutes an attempt
to give the capital sentencers some guidance.5 4 Under the present
statute, there is a separate sentencing hearing before the jury, one
which in many ways replicates an actual trial.55 The statute, however,
permits the parties to present evidence probative of the sentence "regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence,
provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any
hearsay statements."5 6 As in some other states, the statute enumerates the aggravating and5 mitigating
circumstances that are to guide the
7
jury in its deliberations.
The mitigating circumstances are, of course, of special concern to
the defense. In Lockett v. Ohio,5 8 the United States Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death. 9
54. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 5, at 197 ("Florida's statutory provision that a
judge may override a jury's life recommendation is not based upon any legislative or judicial judgment that the life-to-death override serves a crucial state interest. Rather, the
provision is a product of the Legislature's reasonable misunderstanding that such an override provision was required by... Furman.").
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 1994). The statute also provides that the
"subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida." Id.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)-(6) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). Of the other three
override states, Alabama and Indiana also have statutes that list aggravators and mitigators. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-49, 13A-5-51 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)-(c)
(Bums 1995). Delaware's statute, however, enumerates only the aggravating circumstances. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (Supp. 1994).
58. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
59. Id. at 604. The Lockett Court underscored that "an individualized decision is essential in capital cases" and the courts need to treat "each defendant in a capital case with
that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual." Id. at 605; see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (trial judge's exclusion of evidence of the defendant's emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor and consideration of only the circumstance of the defendant's youth violates the Eighth Amendment); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1986) (trial judge's exclusion of testimony in the sentencing
phase regarding the defendant's "good adjustment" to incarceration between arrest and
trial was improper because the evidence was mitigating).
See generally Daniel R. Harris, CapitalSentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat
from the "Death is Different" Doctrine,40 AM. U. L. REv. 1389, 1403-05 (1991) (discussing
the requirement of individualized sentencing); Joshua N. Sondheimer, A Continuing
Source of Aggravation: The Improper Considerationof MitigatingFactors in Death Penalty
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Consequently, the defense has quite a range of mitigating factors to
work with in the sentencing phase. The Florida statute, which is compatible with Lockett and its progeny, provides that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the [enumerated factors],"6 with no
limiting preamble to the list of statutory mitigators. 6 1 As such, the
mitigators are sufficiently expansive and can encompass a rather vast
panoply of details about the capital defendant and crime. 62
Within the category of mitigation, defendants can, at a minimum,
divulge their age and the absence of a "significant history of prior
criminal activity. '63 Juries can hear how the felony occurred while the
defendants were under the influence of extreme emotional or mental
disturbance and learn of the victim's consent or participation in the
act.64 Such defendants can further explain that they were "[accomplices] in the capital felony committed by another person," that they
played a relatively minor part in the whole act, and that they "acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person. '6S Moreover, such juries can, at least, consider the defendSentencing, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 409, 410 (1990) (discussing how jurors may "improperly
weigh mitigating factors on the side of aggravation, altering the proper balance between
aggravating and mitigating factors in a particular case").
60. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(6) (West 1994); see Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250
n.8 (1976); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); see also Campbell v. State, 571
So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990) ("When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing
court must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed
by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the
case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature.").
62. See, ag., Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1995). In Larkin, the court noted:
During sentencing, defense counsel also relied on Dr. Dee's testimony to establish other nonstatutory mitigating circumstances relating to Larkins' personal
history .... [T]his testimony and other evidence established that: (1) Larkins'
previous conviction was not murder but manslaughter; (2) he was a poor reader;
(3) he experienced difficulty in school; (4) he dropped out of school at the fifth or
sixth grade; (5) the offense was the result of impulsivity and irritability; (6) he
drank alcoholic beverages the night of the incident; (7) he functions at the lower
20% of the population in intelligence; (8) he came from a barren cultural background; (9) his memory ranks in the lowest one percent of the population; (10) he
has chronic mental problems caused by drugs and alcohol; (11) he is withdrawn
and has difficulty establishing relationships.
IL at 100-01; see also Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441, 446-47 (Fla. 1995) (discussing
defendant's badly deprived and unstable childhood, physical and emotional problems, alcohol and drug abuse, good character, reliable employment, and good behavior in prison as
mitigating factors).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(6)(a), (g) (West 1994). The statutory mitigators in two
of the other override states, Alabama and Indiana, are quite similar to those in Florida.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-50-2-9(c) (Bums 1995).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b)-(c) (West 1994).
65. d. § 921.141(6)(d)-(e).
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ants' capacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct and that
the capacity "to conform [their] conduct to the requirements of [the]
law was substantially impaired.16 6 As such, the statutory mitigators
alone are quite unlimited and, when combined with the seeming infinity of nonstatutory mitigators, can successfully transmit to the jury a
defense narrative with little recension.
As participants in capital sentencing, juries are not just the "conscience" or "voice" of the community. They simultaneously function
as the intended recipients of the defendant's mitigative life noises. In
the language of synecdoche, the capital-sentencing jury acts as the
community's tympanic membrane.
Some purposeful inexactitude might be at work in the jury's deliberative processing of the defense narrative. Sometimes residual or
lingering doubt that the jury has with respect to the defendant's guilt
makes its way into the deliberations. 67 Although such doubt does not
rise to a level sufficient to prompt an acquittal, it either makes the
sentencing jury more receptive to the mitigative narrative or becomes
what is tantamount to an actual mitigator. 68 Also, where there are no
"antimercy instructions ' 69 or where such instructions exist but do not
effectively snuff out the jurors' merciful impulses, the jury's "compassion for the individual" 7° may move a jury to spare a life. While feel66. Id.§ 921.141(6)(f).
67. See Jennifer R. Treadway, Note, 'ResidualDoubt' in CapitalSentencing: No Doubt
it is an AppropriateMitigating Factor,43 CASE W. RFs. L. RFv. 215,215 (1992) ("Residual
doubt is any remaining or lingering doubt a jury has concerning the defendant's guilt despite having been satisfied 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' In certain states,, the jury may
consider residual doubt as a non-statutory mitigating factor.") (footnote omitted); see also
William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why JurorsVote Life or Death: OperativeFactors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1987) (defining lingering
doubt).
68. See Treadway, supra note 67 (discussing how residual doubt is logical and relevant
and is an operative mitigating factor in capital sentencing); see also Smith v. Balkcom, 660
F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) ("There may be no reasonabledoubt-doubt based upon
reason-and yet some genuine doubt exists. It may reflect a mere possibility; it may be but
the whimsy of one juror or several. Yet this whimsical doubt-this absence of absolute
certainty--can be real."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
69. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-ConsiderationPrinciple and the Death
Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment,29 Hous. L. REv. 493, 531-36 (1992) (discussing
antisympathy instructions); Samuel H. Pillsbury, EmotionalJustice Moralizing the Passions
of CriminalPunishment,74 CORNELL L. REv. 655 (1989) (analyzing the impact emotions
have on retributive capital sentencing); see, eg., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540
(1987) (upholding instruction directing the jury to refrain from basing its sentencing decision on "'mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling"').
70. Brown, 479 U.S. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[W]e adhere so strongly to
our belief that sentencers should have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant's life on
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ings such as residual doubt and mercy can resist identification, and
often operate on something akin to a deliberative subliminal plane,
they are nevertheless present. Although sometimes amorphous,
mercy and doubt influence death penalty decisionmaking.
One of the basic assumptions behind having the jury act as decisionmaker is that a group can do better than one. As the United
States Supreme Court stated as early as 1874, "[i]t is assumed that
twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one
man; that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted
facts . . . than can a single judge. '7 1 In the death penalty context,
having a group make the determination fosters what Justice Stevens
calls "respect for the value of human life." 72 As Justice Stevens saw it,
"the public presumes that a death sentence imposed by a jury reflects
the community's judgment that death is the appropriate response to
the defendant's crime." 73 Because that "presumption does not attach
to a lone government official's decree,"'74 such a judicial imposition of
death can devalue human life itself and, in turn, effectually proliferate
killing.
In twenty-nine of the thirty-three states which involve juries in
capital sentencing, the jury's decision is final. 75 Four states, however,
allow judges to reject the jury's advice. 76 When a jury advises a life
sentence and a judge replaces it with the death penalty, the override
tramples upon the most sacred principles. In the sentencing phase,
the jury, as the tympanic membrane, has received the most unsilenced,
undisplaced, and unfalsified defense sounds that can travel through
the mitigative cavities. If, after processing such defense noises, the
rightful outcome translates itself into a spared life and the judge then
trumps that with death, such judicial obliteration nullifies a process
especially designed to maximize the opportunity for the defense to
fight for life. That is, through the effectual deracination of the rightful
account of compassion for the individual because, recognizing that the capital sentencing
decision must be made in the context of 'contemporary values,' . . . we see in the sentencer's expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply value.")
(citation omitted); see also Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
CapitalPunishment, 99 YALm L.. 389 (1989).
71. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1874); see also
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 41, at 498.
72. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1041 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 4-6.
76. See supra notes 5-6.
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audience for that mitigative defense narrative, such an override constitutes the excision of the tympanic membrane.
While a judicial override of a typical jury decision derogates the
role of the jury, a judicial rejection of a jury life verdict spawns unique
damage. This Article argues such a specific excision of the tympanic
membrane in the form of nullification of jury life advice inevitably
engenders the trivialization of human life.
II. The Augmentation of Death Bias
A. The Caldwell Decision
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme Court
deemed it unconstitutional for a prosecutor to lead the death sentencer to believe that someone else is ultimately responsible for making the life or death decision.77 Although the Supreme Court has
considerably eroded Caldwell,78 the Caldwell reasoning applies to
override capital sentencing statutes.
In Caldwell, the defendant shot and killed the owner' of a small
grocery store.79 In this Mississippi bifurcated proceeding, the jury
convicted Caldwell of capital murder.8 0 In the sentencing hearing, the
defense attorneys presented Caldwell's "youth, family background,
and poverty, as well as general character evidence" as mitigating factors.' In an effort to inspire the jury to appreciate the gravity of the
situation and the enormity of their responsibility, the defense attorney
argued:
[Every] life is precious and as long as there's life in the soul of a
person, there is hope. There is hope, but life is one thing and
death is final. So I implore you to think deeply about this matter. It is his life or death-the decision you're going to have to
make, and I implore you to exercise your prerogative to spare
the life of Bobby Caldwell .... I'm sure [the prosecutor is]go-

ing to say to you that Bobby Caldwell is not a merciful person,
but I say unto you he is a human being. That he has a life that
rests in your hands. You can give him life or you can give him
death. It's going to be your decision. I don't know what else I
can say to you but we live in a society where we are taught that
an eye for an eye is not the solution.... You are the judges and
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

472 U.S. 320 (1985).
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 324.
Id.
1&
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you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome responsibility,
I know-an awesome responsibility. 2
The prosecutor responded by trying to diminish that sense of
"awesome responsibility," and argued to the jury the defense had actually done something improper.83 The prosecutor then stated, "I
think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have you believe
that you're going to kill this man and they know-they know that
your decision is not the final decision." 8 Before the defense objected,
the prosecutor asserted, "My '85
God, how unfair can you be? Your job
is reviewable. They know it."
The trial court overruled the defense objection, and determined
that the jury should be told that the sentence "is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands." 6 Consequently, the prosecutor continued:
They said "Thou shalt not kill." If that applies to him, it'applies
to you, insinuating that your decision is the final decision and
that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in front of this
Courthouse in moments and string him up and that is terribly,
terribly unfair. For they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker
has told you, that the decision you render is automatically reand I think it's
viewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically,
87
unfair and I don't mind telling them so.
The jury sentenced Caldwell to death, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court affirmed the sentence.88 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the prosecutor's comments violated the Eighth Amendment.89
The Supreme Court stated, "Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has taken as a given that capital sentencers would view their task as
the serious one of determining whether a specific human being should
die at the hands of the State."' The Court then determined that the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 325.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 325-26.
88. Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1983). While the Mississippi court unanimously affirmed the conviction, it divided four to four on the validity of the death sentence. Id at 807. In affirming, the court relied on the decision in California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that the decision to mention appellate
review was the State's. Caldwell, 443 So. 2d at 813. The dissent, although not disputing
that interpretation of Ramos, argued that under state law, the prosecutor's argument was
unfair. Id. at 815-17 (Lee, J., dissenting).
89. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
90. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
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state-induced suggestion that "the sentencing jury may shift its... responsibility to an appellate court" creates both substantial unreliability and a bias in favor of death sentences. 91
First, the Court attributed the death bias to the limitation inherent in the appellate process itself, which was something that a jury of
lay people might not readily grasp. 92 As the Court explained, the delegation of sentencing responsibility which the prosecution had urged
"not only postpones the defendant's right to a fair determination of
the appropriateness of his death" sentence, but would actually deprive
him of that right. 93
What made such prosecutorial conduct an outright deprivation of
a jury decision on death was that appellate courts are basically "illsuited" to make the death decision in the first instance. 94 As the Caldwell Court saw it, "'compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind"' are indeed relevant in capital sentencing and "sentencers who [are] present to hear the evidence
and arguments and see the witnesses," are best adept at considering
such intangibles. 95 Lastly, the jury's notion that the appellate tribunal
can independently decide the life-or-death issue is, of course, inaccurate.96 Thus, the result can be an execution without a death sentencer
ever determining whether death is the appropriate sentence. 97
Second, the Court adopted Justice Stevens's assessment of a similar prosecutorial argument in another case-his fear that it presents
"an intolerable danger of bias toward a death sentence." 98 That is,
even if the jury does not believe that the death penalty is actually
appropriate, it might nevertheless issue such a sentence just to "send a
message" of its disapproval of the defendant's conduct. 99 Such perceived delegation could make the jury feel at liberty to send such a
message since it believes the appellate court will simply correct the
error.10° The result can be an execution not called for by the
sentencer.
91. Id. at 330.

92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id-at
MLat
l at
Id. at
Id.
IL at

331 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
331-32.
332.
331.
330.
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Third, the Court pointed out that death bias can derive from the
jury's understanding that only a death sentence will be reviewed. 101
For the jury, this could transmute into a belief that any decision to
delegate sentencing can only be effectuated by returning the death
sentence. 1°2 Thus, the prosecutorial conduct posed a danger that the
issuance of a death penalty might simply signify the sentencer wished
to avoid responsibility for the decision-not that the senfencer actually deemed death to be the proper sentence.
Finally, the Court elaborated on how the circumstances of a capital trial can magnify the severity of the prejudice of such prosecutorial
comments:
A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a
very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult
and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence
and argument on the issue of whether another should die, and
they are asked to decide that issue on behalf of the commu-

nity.... Given such a situation, the uncorrected suggestion that
the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will
rest with others presents an intolerable danger that... in a case

in which the jury is divided on the proper sentence, the presence
of appellate review could effectively be used for an argument for
why those jurors who are reluctant to invoke the death sentence
should nevertheless give in.1 3

According to the Court, the danger of a death-biased jury was increased by the jury's possible glorification of the purported delegatees
as the "legal authorities" with "more of a 'right' to make such an important decision."'' 4
101. Id.at 332.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 333.
104. Id. In Caldwell, the State also advanced arguments for upholding the death sentence despite the prosecutor's comments. First, it argued that under California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992 (1983), it is the State's responsibility to determine what a capital sentencing
jury should know about post-sentencing proceedings. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 335. Next, it
asserted the prosecutor's comments were "invited" or rather, "a reasonable response to
defense counsel's arguments." Id. Lastly, the State, relying on Donnely v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637 (1974), insisted there could be no finding of constitutional error based on the
prosecutorial comments. Caldwell 472 U.S. at 335. The Caldwell Court, however, rejected
all three backup contentions.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote separately to express her view that
Ramos does not "imply that the giving of nonmisleading and accurate information regarding the jury's role in the sentencing scheme is irrelevant to the sentencing decision." Id. at
341 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, what made the prosecutor's remarks "impermissible" was that "they were inaccurate and misleading." Id. at 342.
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White joined. After accusing the Court of mischaracterizing the prosecutor's argument,
the dissent admonished that precedent "teach[es] that a death sentence need not be va-
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In the wake of Caldwell, the Supreme Court narrowed its application to certain types of comments during sentencing that mislead the
jury about its role in the sentencing process in a way thai allows the
jury to feel less responsible for the sentencing decision. 10 5 Despite
such ostensible limiting of Caldwell to situations where misleading
comments go to the jury, in truth, the danger of creating a death-biased jury or purely delegatory death verdict is present whenever any
message-accurate or inaccurate-has the effect of minimizing the
sense of importance that the jury attaches to its role in capital
sentencing.
B.

Augmented Death Bias

In a jury override system, the jurors are aware that the ultimate
responsibility for life or death rests not with themselves but with the
trial judge. 0 6 As one commentator has pointed out, a jury faced with
its diminished sentencing role is "prone toward the same death bias
cated in every case where the procedures by which it is imposed are in some way flawed."
Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent also asserted that there was "nothing
wrong with urging a capital sentencing jury to disregard emotion and render a decision
based on the law and the facts." Id. at 349.
105. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.14 (1986). In Darden, the Court distinguished Caldwell on other grounds. Unlike the situation in Caldwell, the comments in
Darden were not made at sentencing, but at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, which
reduced the possibility or degree of effect on sentencing. Id. at 183 n.14. Also, in Darden,
the "trial judge did not approve of the comments, and several times instructed the jurors
that the arguments were not evidence and that their decision was to be based only on the
evidence." Id. at 183-84 n.14.
In the wake of Darden,the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described
the role assigned to the jury by local law." Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); see
also Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009-10 (1994) (rejecting contention that the
admission of evidence regarding defendant's prior death sentence did not trigger Caldwell
rule by undermining the jury's sense of responsibility); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241
(1990) (prisoner whose murder conviction became final before Caldwell rule was announced could not use the rule to challenge his capital sentence in federal habeas corpus
action because it was not a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure necessary to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding).
106. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561,574 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Smith
v. State, 581 So. 2d 497, 519-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Ex parte Smith, 581 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991) (trial court instructs jury that its sentencing
authority is advisory and a recommendation)); Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 100 (Fla.
1995) ("Florida's standard jury instruction in capital cases instructs that the jury's role is
advisory, but important."); Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1043-44 (Ind. 1994) (jury was
informed that responsibility for sentencing rests with the judge); see also Mello, supra note
26, at 303 (in override states, "[a]t some point in the sentencing proceeding.... the jury...
is told that the ultimate sentencing responsibility rests not upon itself, but with the trial
judge").
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against which the Court warned in Caldwell.' 0 7 Further, a jury override system does not create merely the same death bias that the Caldwell Court feared, but actually an augmented death bias. 08
What the Caldwell Court feared was the institutional limits of appellate review, coupled with a jury's lack of appreciation of these limits, could cause the outright deprivation of the right to a fair
determination of the appropriateness of a death sentence. 10 9 The
Florida override scheme should elicit the same fear. Although Florida's capital sentencing judges, unlike appellate courts, are present to
hear the evidence and arguments and see the witnesses," 0 they are
nevertheless quite analogous to appellate tribunals."' As discussed
below, Florida has the Tedder safeguard, which prohibits judges from
freely disregarding the jury's sentence and replacing it with their own
judgment." 2 Therefore, the Florida jury's sentence carries great
107. Mello, supra note 26, at 303. The Supreme Court's subsequent narrowing of Caldwell to "misleading" information that diminishes the jury's role, see supra note 105, has
given courts a basis for rejecting arguments that juries, aware that they are advisory and
their verdict is a recommendation, have an unconstitutional Caldwell bias. See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (because "the challenged instructions accurately
described the role of [Florida's advisory] jury under state law, there is no basis for a Caldwell claim"); Smith, 588 So. 2d at 574 (informing jurors that judge could change death
sentence at judge's discretion did not violate Caldwell because it "in no way misled the jury
as to its role in sentencing"); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 941 (Del.), cert denied, 115 S.
Ct. 110 (1994) (prosecutor's remarks concerning the judge's "ultimate decision" was distinguishable from Caldwell because it did not misstate the law or mislead the jury); Sochor v.
State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 1993) (Florida's jury instructions are accurate and do not
violate Caldwell); Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1044 (because the information concerning the
jury's role in the death sentence was an "accurate reflection[ ] of the law in Indiana," it did
not violate Caldwell principles).
108. See Nicks v. Alabama, 487 U.S. 1241, 1241 (1988) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan,
J., dissenting to denial of writ of certiorari). In Nicks, the prosecutor argued to the jury:
The opinion, which you will come to a conclusion when you go back and deliberate-Let me say this, it will be only an advisory opinion. The law provides for
you to present this to the Court for their consideration. The ultimate decisions
[sic] rests with Judge Reynolds. He will be the one to take whatever ruling that
you send out and decide whether it will be life without parole or death by electrocution in the electric chair.
Id. at 1242. The dissent expressed its view that the argument "perhaps even more baldly
than the statements in Caldwell,sought to minimize the jury's sense of its awesome responsibility to determine whether petitioner would live or die by encouraging the jury to view
its verdict as merely 'advisory."' Id. (emphasis added); see also Bundy v. Dugger, 488 U.S.
1036, 1036 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of stay of
execution).
109. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
110. Id. at 331.
111. Cf. Mello, supra note 26, at 299.
112. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975); see infranotes 146-150 and accompanying text.
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weight and can be rejected by the judge only when virtually
no rea11 3
sonable person could have made the recommendation.
Even Florida juries, which are somehow aware of the Tedder
standard, can lack the sophistication to really grasp its significance. In
the same way that many lay people vaguely believe that appellate
courts actually retry cases, advisory juries can similarly view the sentencing judge as an unconstrained overrider. Thus, Florida juries, like
the Caldwell jury, can believe they are delegating the ultimate decision, and therefore pronounce a death sentence without giving it full
consideration. In Florida, as in the Caldwell situation, an improperly
delegated death sentence can end up with the supposed delegatee rubber-stamping the prosecutor's recommendation.
In an override system, such as Alabama's, where the judge must
only "consider" the jury's recommendation, 4 the judge as the unconstrained decisionmaker is not a mere potential perception but in fact a
reality. Consequently, where the judge is the true delegatee, the dangers inherent in jury diminution of responsibility for the death sentence are present. Also, as discussed below in connection with Harris,
the actual practice of Alabama judges makes the delegatory death
sentence of an Alabama jury even more likely to result in an improper
execution." 5
In a jury override system, a jury can do what the Caldwell Court
feared-send a message of its disapproval of the defendant's actswithout a trace of inhibition. In Caldwell, the Court reasoned the
mere prospect of an appellate court on call to correct the sentence
eased the way for a jury to send a message in the form of a death
verdict. In an override system, the pronunciation of death may be
even easier because, as the jury sees it, the perceived delegatee is right
there in the
room to correct the send-the-message verdict almost
11 6
instantly.
Further, the Caldwell Court articulated its concern that "[the imposition of] a death sentence out of a desire to avoid responsibility for
its decision presents the specter of the imposition of death based on a
factor wholly irrelevant to legitimate sentencing concerns.""17 In an
override system, a jury, wishing to ensure reviewability by issuing a
death sentence, can do so with impunity. This is because the only con113. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910; see infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
114. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994); see also Harris v. Alabama, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 1033
(1995).

115. See infra notes 210-222, 263-265 and accompanying text.
116. See Mello, supra note 26, at 297-99.
117. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332 (1985).
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ceivable impediment to a jury imposing death, for the sole purpose of
securing appellate review, is its extant awareness that responsibility
avoidance is not and cannot be a legitimate basis for a death recommendation. An override system, however, effectively eradicates this
one conceivable impediment to a purely delegatory sentence: understanding that judges can almost instantly right their wrong, an advisory jury believes that the judge will impose life if the judge finds an
illegitimate factor behind the jury's death recommendation. As such,
advisory juries can view it as a "win-win" situation and thus reason
that a decision with an illegitimate basis will be fixed by the judge, and
if not, will proceed to a higher court for review. In short, jury override
can be viewed as delegation without guilt.
Also, the Caldwell Court emphasized the pressures on a sentencing jury "placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a
very difficult and uncomfortable choice," 118 and acknowledged the enticement inherent in a diminution of their role. That sense of relief, in
the form of diminished responsibility due to practically immediate judicial review, must be viewed as even more attractive to an advisory
jury sitting in the same capital sentencing pressure cooker. 19
The Caldwell Court reasoned, when jurors know that the real
decisionmakers will be the justices of the state's highest court, "[ilt is
certainly plausible to believe that many jurors will be tempted to view
these respected legal authorities as having more of a 'right' to make
such an important decision than has the jury.' 20 But, as Professor
Mello has aptly stated, while "the high court stands as a distant abstraction.., the trial judge is posted as the immediate and tangible
legal authority. She is their judge."' 2 ' As Professor Mello has illustrated, the courtroom formalities reinforce the respect that the jury
develops for their judge:
Cloaked in her black robe, the trial judge emerges from the recesses of her chambers. All rise as she enters the courtroom and
climbs to her elevated position on the bench. These images all
serve to establish and reinforce the image of the trial judge as
the preeminent legal authority. It is within this context that the
jury views the trial judge."2
Unlike the Caldwell situation, where the supposed sentencers are
the lofty, faceless justices on the state supreme court, the override sys118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 333.
See Mello, supra note 26, at 298.
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
Mello, supra note 26, at 297.
Id. at 298.
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tem portrays the real sentencer as the jury's own judge, the individual
who guided them personally through the "very difficult and uncomfortable" ordeal. 123 Further, because capital proceedings tend to be
lengthy, by the time sentencing arrives, the advisory jury has embraced their judge as part of their family-their parent. 124 In such a
situation, delegating responsibility to the symbolic parent is not just
easy but quite natural.
Consequently, all of the prejudicial effects the Caldwell Court
identified are magnified when it is an advisory jury issuing an advisory
sentence that the judge can reject. It thus follows logically from the
reasoning in Caldwell that, if a jury's mere impression that sentencing
responsibility rests with the appellate court creates a death bias, then
the jurors' understanding that their judge has the real life-or-death
decision creates a death-bias plus.
The Caldwell-like predilection is not the only factor creating a
death-leaning on the part of a capital sentencing jury. Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, jurors who make it unmistakably clear that they will
automatically vote against the death penalty can be excluded."
Thus, the jury will be composed of individuals who will consider
death. Also, under Wainwright v. Witt, the prosecution can exclude
such jurors for cause if their views on the death penalty would "prevent or substantially impair[ ] performance of [their] duties as juror[s].' 26 Both Witherspoon and Wainwright in effect guarantee the
123. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333; supra text accompanying note 118.
124. See Mello, supra note 26, at 298 (quoting SEYMOUR WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A
JURY 146 (1986) ("'Most jurors arrive in a courtroom with great respect for the judge,
whom they see as a fair-minded father [sic] figure interested only in the implementation of

justice."')).
125. 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court determined the
State could not cleanse the jury of "all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle," because that would produce a "hanging jury." Id. at 520. The State, however, could remove venire persons who
made it:
[U]nmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt.
Id. at 522-23 n.21.
126. 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); see Adams v. Texas, 488 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). But see Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2233 (1992) (recognizing defendants have the same right of
specific inquiry previously only granted to prosecutors). For a discussion of death qualification, see James M. Carr, Note, At Witt's End: The ContinuingQuandary of Jury Selection
in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REv. 427 (1987); Valerie T. Rosenson, Note, Wainwright v.
Witt: The Court Casts a False Light Backward, 66 B.U. L. REv. 311 (1986); see also Bruce J.
Winick, Witherspoon in Florida:Reflections on the Challengefor Cause of Jurors in Capital
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presence of a death-qualified jury-a jury who will consider death.
This further magnifies the already augmented death bias, the one intrinsic to the advisory jury system. 127
In the mind of the Caldwell Court, the omnipresent concern was
that the hypothetical botch-the improper execution-happens when
a death sentencer never actually makes the determination that death
is the appropriate sentence. A jury override system, however, which
spawns an augmented death bias, guarantees that the Caldwell Court's
hypothetical horror-the improper execution-will actually
materialize.
In this respect, a jury override system may produce unjustified
executions. In a jury override system, with its built-in augmentedly
death-biased jury, a jury's life recommendation is highly improbable.
What such an outcome signifies is that an advisory jury-with its
Caldwell-plus extreme leaning toward death, after considering the relevant factors-and hearing the arguments nevertheless decided the
capital defendant should live. In such a situation, the circumstances
favoring life had to have been so strong that they overcame not just a
death bias, but an augmented death bias. Thus, the capital defendant
that obtains a life recommendation in a jury override jurisdiction must
have effectually rebutted what is tantamount to an irrebuttable presumption in favor of death.

Cases in a State in Which the Judge Makes the SentencingDecision, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
825 (1983) (suggesting how death qualification creates a jury that might not be impartial
and one that does not represent a fair cross-section of the community); Bruce J. Winick,
ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge Practicesin Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a
Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. Rsv. 1, 6 (1982) (arguing "the use of peremptory
challenges to eliminate potential jurors opposed to the death penalty offends due process
and sixth and eighth amendment values").
127. Also, the impact of a decision like Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), in
which the Court determined the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a jury from considering victim impact evidence, can further increase a jury's leaning toward a death sentence.
See Aida Alaka, Note, Victim Impact Evidence, Arbitrariness,and the Death Penalty: The
Supreme Court Flipflops in Payne v. Tennessee, 23 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 581, 617 (1992)
(Payne decision "justif[ies] the introduction of arbitrary, capricious, and inflammatory evidence into the sentencing phase of a capital trial"); Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The
Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at CapitalSentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 1621 (1992) (explaining, inter alia, how victim impact evidence will lead to disparate
sentencing of similarly situated defendants); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(7) (West
Supp. 1995) ("[Victim impact evidence] ... shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's
uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death."). In addition, there is a study showing that "misunderstandings
by jurors in capital trials may dispose them to reach the death penalty." Scott Burgins,
Jurors Ignore, Misunderstand Instructions,81 A.B.A. J. 30 (1995).
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When a judge overrides such an advisory life sentence, he or she
is arbitrarily imposing a death conclusion on facts that overwhelmingly and almost conclusively warrant life. The danger feared in Caldwell-that someone will die who should not-is the almost certain
result of a judge's rejection of an advisory jury's life recommendation.

1H.

The Annihilation of the Only Safeguard
A. The Tedder Safeguard
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has approved Florida's capital sentencing statute and paid homage to the
"significant safeguard" that the Tedder standard affords a defendant.128 In Tedder v. State, Tedder's wife and mother-in-law were laying
a sidewalk outside their trailer.1 29 Tedder, who had recently separated
from his wife, suddenly stepped out from behind a tree and fired a
shot, causing the women to flee. 130 Tedder's wife ran with the baby to
the back bedroom of the trailer to get a shotgun. 131 While loading the
shotgun, she heard more shots and her mother's screams. 32 Tedder
then broke into the bedroom, took away his wife's shotgun, 33 and
commanded his wife to bring the baby and come with him. 34 While
they were leaving, Tedder's wife saw her mother lying on the floor 1in
36
the hallway. 35 Tedder would not let his wife examine the body.
Tedder's mother-in-law died from the gun shot wounds. 3 7
After the jury convicted Tedder of first degree murder, the sentencing trial was held. 138 The attorneys, however, presented no additional evidence except that Tedder was twenty years old. 139 The jury
deliberated for
only sixteen minutes and recommended life
140
imprisonment.
41
The next day, the trial judge conducted the sentencing hearing.'
The only additional evidence that he considered was a presentence
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984); see also supra note 13.
322 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1975).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.

139. Id
140. Id

141. Id at 909-10.
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investigation report, which showed that Tedder had a prior conviction
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.142
The trial judge overrode the jury recommendation and issued a death
sentence.4 3 Although the judge found no mitigating circumstances,
he listed three aggravating ones: "(1) that [Tedder] knowingly created
a great risk of death to many persons, (2) that the crime was committed while the defendant was ...[also committing] a kidnapping, and
(3) that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."'"
The Florida Supreme Court found the death penalty inappropriate. In so doing, the court said "[a] jury recommendation under [the
Florida] trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great
weight."'145 The court specified that "to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."' 46 The court, concluding that the
situation in Tedder failed to satisfy the standard for overriding the
jury's advisory sentence, directed the trial judge to impose life imprisonment instead. 47
The Tedder standard has figured prominently in United States
Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of Florida's
capital sentencing statute. For example, in the seminal case Spaziano
v. Florida,which was a challenge to a judge's imposition of a death
sentence where the jury had recommended life, the primary evidence
against Spaziano was the testimony of only one witness. 148 According
to that witness, Spaziano had taken him to a garbage dump to show
him the remains of two women he claimed to have tortured and murdered. 4 9 Spaziano attacked the recall and perception of the witness
due to his substantial drug habit.' 50 After deliberating for more than
142. It at 910.
143. IiL
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id at 910-11.
148. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
149. Id. at 450.
150. Id.; see Michael Mello, Innocent Man Faces Execution, MAMI HERALD, June 4,
1995, at C1, C6. Mello, who represented Mr. Spaziano, is convinced his client was innocent; he explained that the State's chief witness, Anthony Dilisio, was 16 years old at the
time of the events in question. Mello, supra,at C6. Apparently, "Dilisio testified [that] he
never believed Mr. Spaziano and that he thought Mr. Spaziano was bragging to impress
him." Id. Also, Dilisio "indicated that he idolized Mr. Spaziano... [and] did not report
what he had seen to the police because he wanted to become a member of the Outlaw
Motorcycle Club." Id. What was not revealed, however, to either the judge or the jury was
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six hours, the jury reported itself deadlocked; the trial court then gave
the Allen charge. 5 ' Shortly thereafter, the jury convicted Spaziano of
first-degree murder.
Later, that same jury reviewed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances at the sentencing hearing and recommended life.' 52 The
judge, however, in sentencing Spaziano to death concluded that, in
spite of the jury recommendation, "sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify and authorize a death sentence" and "the
mitigating circumstances
were insufficient to outweigh such aggravat'53
ing circumstances.'
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the death sentence, finding no constitutional infirmity in the override procedure. 4
The court specifically concluded since the evidence in Spaziano satisfied the Tedder standard, it was sufficient to justify the judge's rejection of the jury's life sentence. 5
Justice Blackmun delivered the United States Supreme Court's
affirmance, in which he underscored that it was not a constitutional
requirement that a jury impose the death penalty, and emphasized
what the Court saw as "two fundamental flaws" in Spaziano's argument. 5 s First, the Court disagreed with the notion that there were
that Dilisio's testimony was possibly "manufactured" and that Dilisio did not "'remember'
his story until he was under police hypnosis." Id. Significantly, the Supreme Court of
Florida remanded the Spaziano matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of Dilisio's recanted testimony. Spaziano v. State, No. 67,929, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1428
(Sept. 8, 1995).
151. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 450; see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (creating
the "Allen charge," also known as the "hammer charge").
152. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 451. It has to be quite significant that the once deadlocked
jury decided to recommend life, a phenomenon conceivably attributable to residual or lingering doubt. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also Mello, supra note 150,
at Cl ("Mr. Spaziano is, I believe in my bone marrow, innocent."), C6 ("I am convinced
that Mr. Spaziano is innocent, but I can't prove it with certainty.").
153. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 452. The judge determined the aggravating factors were the
"especially heinous and atrocious" nature of the homicide and the defendant's previous
convictions for violent felonies, and found no mitigators except "perhaps, the age of the
defendant." Id.
154. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1983). In the first appeal, the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the conviction, but reversed the death sentence. Spaziano v.
State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981). The problem with the sentence was that the trial court
had relied on confidential information in the presentence investigation report without disclosure to the defense or giving the defense an opportunity to respond to the evidence. I.
at 1122. On remand, the trial court ordered a new presentence investigation report and
invited the defense to present evidence in response. Spaziano, 433 So. 2d at 510. After
Spaziano offered no such evidence, the judge sentenced Spaziano to death. It.
155. Spaziano, 433 So. 2d at 511.
156. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461.
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clear demarcations between capital and noncapital sentences. The
Court, for example, pointed out that "[alIthough incapacitation has
never been embraced as a sufficient justification for the death penalty,
'
it is a legitimate consideration in a capital sentencing proceeding."157
Further, the Court rejected the argument that retribution-which "is
an element of all punishments society imposes"-is
what sets the
8
sentences.Y1
noncapital
from
apart
penalty
death
Second, the Court expressed the view that, even if it were true
that the death penalty had a unique retributive purpose, it did not
follow that such a sentence was within the exclusive domain of the
jury. As the Court explained, "[i]mposing the sentence in individual
cases is not the sole or even the primary vehicle through which the
community's voice can be expressed."'1 59 The Spaziano Court
elaborated:
The sentencer is responsible for weighing the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances the legislature has determined
are necessary touchstones in determining whether death is the
appropriate penalty. Thus, even if it is a jury that imposes the
sentence, the 'community's voice' is not given free rein. The
community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature
when the death penalty is authorized and the particular circumstances in which death is appropriate are defined. 160
As such, the Court concluded that a judge alone could properly
impose death. Although the Court acknowledged that a majority of
states have juries perform capital sentencing, it recited that "[t]he
Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.' 161 From there, the Court reasoned that "[i]f a
judge may be vested with sole responsibility for imposing the penalty,
then there is nothing constitutionally wrong with the judge's exercising that responsibility after receiving the advice of the jury."' 6
Significantly, the Court commended Florida's Tedder standard
and denominated it as a "significant safeguard" for the capital defendant. 163 The Court also expressed its satisfaction that the Florida
157. Id. at 461-62 (citations omitted).

158. Id. at 462.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citations omitted).

161. Id. at 464.
162. Id. at 465.
163. Id.
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Supreme Court took the standard seriously and did not hesitate to
reverse a trial court where it had derogated the jury's role. 6"
B. The Effect of an Annihilation of the Tedder Safeguard
Implicit in the praise of the Tedder standard as a "significant safeguard"'165 is the Court's enfeebling of its own conclusion that the
death penalty need not issue from a jury. Under Tedder, a jury life
sentence enjoys "great weight" and the judge cannot reject the jury's
advice unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death ... [are] so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."'166 Because the "reasonable person" is the juror, then literal
compliance with the Tedder standard should elicit judicial adherence
to the advisory jury verdict. Thus, implicit in the Spaziano Court's
ostensible support of Florida's Tedder safeguard is the Court's unspoken allegiance to the very principle it purported to reject-capital sentencing is, in truth, the jury's job.
In his dissenting opinion in Spaziano, Justice Stevens argued that
under the Florida scheme, "[t]he administration of the statute actually
reflects a deeply rooted impulse to legitimate the process through involvement of the jury."'1 6 7 According to Justice Stevens, this sense of
the jury as integral to the process emerges, not just in the state's incorporation of an advisory jury, but also because the statute has been
"construed to forbid a trial judge to reject the jury's decision unless he
finds that the evidence in favor of a death sentence is so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could impose a lesser
sentence.'1 68 In the dissent's perspective, Florida's statute actually
endorses the jury as "important to the fairness and legitimacy of capital punishment."' 169 Consequently, what Justice Stevens suggests is
that genuine approbation of the Tedder safeguard in an advisory jury
164. Id. In a dissenting opinion, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, Justice Stevens said:
If the State wishes to execute a citizen, it must persuade a jury of his peers that
death is an appropriate punishment for his offense. If it cannot do so, then I do
not believe it can be said with an acceptable degree of assurance that imposition
of the death penalty would be consistent with the community's sense of proportionality. Thus, in this case Florida has authorized the imposition of disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

165. Id. at 465.
166. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).

167. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 475-76.

169. Id. at 476.
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set-up impugns the Court's notion that juries need not be the death
sentencers.
Before Harris,the Supreme Court recognized that if a judge is
statutorily empowered with a jury override, then the Tedder standard
is crucial to justice. This, however, is not just because the Tedder standard can partially ensure that the death sentence comes from the jury,
which is the "voice of the community," and thus the penalty is truly an
"expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. '170 Additionally, the Tedder safeguard can diminish the potential double jeopardy effect of an override sentencing scheme.
Justice Stevens argues in his Harrisdissent that a statutory provision for a "death sentence upon a verdict by either the jury or the
judge.., would violate the Constitution's command that no defendant
'be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'" 17 ' Under such a potentially
duplicative procedure, a zealous prosecutor who fails to get a death
sentence out of a jury would have a second chance before the judge.
The new decisionmaker would be quite free to accept exactly what
the jury had just rejected.
While an override sentencing scheme by itself has a double jeopardy taint, a Tedder standard is what can save it from becoming the
atrocity that, as Justice Stevens envisioned, would "require[ ] the defendant to stave off a death sentence at each of two de novo sentencing hearings."1 72 In a Tedder system, the defendant receiving life from
a jury has at least a strong recommendation, one that theoretically
carries "great weight" 73 and should minimize the risk of a sudden
turnabout in the form of a judicial imposition of death. Thus, Tedder
can in some situations become a capital defendant's only friend-the
sole insulation from a potentially unconstitutional toxic exposure to
two life-threatening de novo ordeals.
Also, assuming the basic premise that statutory override schemes
create an augmented predilection on the part of the sentencing jury to
issue a death sentence, then Tedder is not just important, it is critical.
When an advisory jury, although imbued with an extreme death bias
nevertheless decides on life imprisonment, it has, in effect, announced
that death is not just inappropriate but in fact overwhelmingly inappropriate. Specifically, to that advisory jury, the evidence so substan170. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); see supra note 46.
171. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. V).

172. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
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tially supported life that it rebutted a practically irrebuttable
presumption in favor of death. As explained, a jury recommendation
of life in an override jurisdiction is not just life, but life to the zenithal
degree.
While in an augmentedly death-biased arena, a judge's singlehanded obliteration of the seemingly extraordinary life verdict is an
outrage, a Tedder standard, which can inhibit such judicial overrides,
is and can become the only conceivable saving grace. It is the iota of
amelioration in a world of extreme death predilection.
IV. Harris v. Alabama as the Excised Tympanic Membrane
with Augmented Death Bias and Without the Tedder
Safeguard
A. The Harris Decision
1. Background
In Harris v. Alabama, a jury convicted Louise Harris of capital
*murder174 on the following facts. Harris was married to a deputy sheriff and having an affair with Lorenzo McCarter. 175 When Harris requested McCarter to get someone to kill her husband, McCarter
solicited a coworker, who not only refused but told his supervisor
about the incident.1 76 McCarter, however, did find accomplices
(Sockwell and Hood), paid them $100, and vaguely promised them
more money when they completed the deed.177 On the night of the
planned murder, Harris alerted McCarter on his beeper that her husband was leaving for work. 78 McCarter and Hood stationed themselves in the car on a nearby street while Sockwell hid in the bushes by
a stop sign. 7 9 When Harris's husband pulled up at the intersection,
Sockwell emerged and shot the victim "point blank." 8 0 After questioning, the police arrested Harris.' 8 ' McCarter agreed to cooperate
with the State "in exchange for the prosecutor's promise not to seek
the death penalty."'" Consequently, McCarter testified that Harris
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

115 S. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1995).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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had sought his help in killing her husband so that they could share in
his death benefits of about $250,000.18'
In Alabama, such a conviction entitles the defendant to a sentencing hearing before the trial jury unless both parties waive that
procedure and the court approves the waiver."8 At the sentencing
hearing, the State must prove the statutory aggravating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt,8 5 and the defendant may proffer mitigating circumstances which the State must disprove by a preponderance of the
evidence.18 6 If the jury finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, then it should recommend death." 7 Otherwise, the advisory verdict is life imprisonment without parole. 8s If
ten jurors agree, the jury may recommend death. 18 9 The verdict of life
imprisonment, however, requires a simple majority. 190

After the judge learns of the jury recommendation and the actual
vote tally, he or she may impose the sentence. The sentencing statute
provides:
In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine
whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist oi4tweigh
the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in doing so the
trial court shall consider the recommendation of the jury contained in its advisory verdict.... While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not
binding upon the court.' 91
If the judge imposes a death sentence, there is automatic review in the
appellate court. 92 If the appellate court affirms, the Alabama
Supreme Court grants certiorari as a matter of right.'"
It was under this Alabama sentencing scheme that Louise Harris
had a sentencing hearing. At her hearing, several witnesses attested
to her good background and strong character. 94 Harris was rearing
seven children, holding three jobs at once, and participating actively in
183. Id.
184. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-44(c) (1994).
185. Id. § 13A-5-45(e).
186. Id. § 13A-5-45(g).
187. Id. § 13A-5-46(e).
188. Id. § 13A-5-46(e)(2).
189. Id. § 13A-5-46(f).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 13A-5-47(e).
192. Id. § 13A-5-53(a).
193. Id, § 13A-5-53(b). Also, the "appellate courts must independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether the death penalty is disproportionate to sentences rendered in comparable cases." Id., quoted in Harris v. Alabama, 115
S. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1995).

194. Harris,115 S. Ct. at 1033.

252

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 23:217

her church.195 The jury thus recommended, by a seven to five vote,
that she be imprisoned for life without parole.196
The judge overrode the jury recommendation and imposed the
death sentence.' 97 In so doing, the judge found the existence of only
one aggravating circumstance-Harris had commissioned the murder
for pecuniary gain. 198 The judge found the absence of a prior criminal
record to be a statutory mitigator. 199 As nonstatutory mitigators, the
judge found Harris to be a hardworking, respected member of her
church and community. 200 After stressing that it was Harris who had
planned and financed the commission of the crime and stood to benefit the most from it, the judge determined that "the one statutory aggravating circumstance ...far outweighed all of the nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, and that the sentence ought to be death."2 0 '
In separate proceedings, juries convicted Harris's coconspirators
of capital murder.2° - While McCarter and Hood received life imprisonment, the judge sentenced Sockwell, the one who actually pulled
the trigger, to death.20 3 With respect to Sockwell's sentence, the judge
also overrode the jury's advisory life verdict.20 4
In the state appellate court, Harris unsuccessfully argued the capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional because it did not specify
the weight the judge must accord the jury's recommendation, and thus
had the effect of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.205 After
the state appellate court affirmed Harris's sentence, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 206
2. The Supreme Court Decision
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice O'Connor compared
Alabama's and Florida's sentencing schemes.207 As the Court noted,
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

200. Id.
201. Id.

202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1034.
206. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Harris's contention that the
Tedder standard was a constitutional requisite. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 538 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992), aff'd sub noma. Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993), cert. granted
sub nom. Harris v. Alabama, 114 S.Ct. 2736 (1994) (No. 93-7659).
207. Harris, 115 S.Ct. at 1034.
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while both states "require jury participation in the sentencing process
but give ultimate sentencing authority to the trial judge," the Florida
Supreme Court has mandated that the trial judge give great weight to
the jury's recommendation. °s Specifically, the Court acknowledged
that the Tedder standard precluded a Florida judge from overriding a
life verdict unless "'the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
209
differ.' ,
In contrast, Alabama lacked what Harris asserted was essentialthe Tedder standard or its functional equivalent. In Alabama, the
judge had merely to "consider" the jury's recommendation. 210 Harris
urged the distinction between Alabama and Florida was significant
because the Eighth Amendment required the State to define the
weight that the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury
21
verdict. '
The Supreme Court, ostensibly interpreting its decision in Spaziano, recited that it had:
rejected the contention that "placing the responsibility on a trial
judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give
final authority to the jury to make the life-or-death decision.""'
From there, the Court conceded that it had on numerous occasions
praised the "crucial protection" that the Tedder standard provides to
the defendant. 213 According to the Court, however, such praise was
not equivalent to its elevation of the Tedder standard to the stature of
a constitutional mandate.21 4 Rather, as the HarrisCourt saw it, "the
hallmark of the analysis [was] not the particular weight a State
chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but whether the scheme adequately channels
the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary
,215
results.
Also, the Court elaborated somewhat on its pattern of deferring
to state legislatures. For example, the Court had neither required that
states specify a "'method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding,"' nor that they ascribe any
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984)).
Id. at 1035 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977)).
Id.
Id.
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specific weight to particular factors. 216 In the Court's perspective, it
thus followed that its imposition of the "great weight" standard on the
jury recommendation "would offend ... established principles and
place within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest 217
within the State's discretion to administer its criminal justice
system.

Further, the Court rejected Harris's contention that, under Alabama law, the jury actually enjoys the key sentencing role and is subject only to review by the judge. 1 In making this argument, Harris
mentioned the Alabama appellate court reversals of death sentences
due to the advisory juries' exposure to prejudicial error.2 19 As Harris
submitted, such courts had to have concluded that, although the judge
was not infected by the same harmful error, reversal was nevertheless
warranted because the death penalty was really the jury's verdict.2 -0
The Court, however, responded that the reason the death sentence
reversals were proper in those harmful error cases was because "the
jury recommendation play[ed] a role in the judge's decision," not because the recommendation was necessarily the "determinative" factor.2 21

As the Court stated, "[e]rror is committed when the jury

considers an invalid factor and its verdict is in turn considered by the
judge ...

."222

While the Supreme Court acknowledged some of the statistics in
Florida and Alabama, the Court ultimately described the numbers as
meaningless'
The Court stated the numbers were virtually useless
because they could not propel the Court into the "minds of the decisionmakers" or tell them "how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life imprisonment is adopted would have ended differently
had the judge not been required to consider the jury's advice."2' 4 The
Court further stated that statistics had no bearing on the constitutionality of such sentencing schemes. 225 The Court stressed the real issue
216. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988)).
217. Id. at 1036.
218. Id
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id
223. Id The Court observed in Florida, capital defendants had "'a second chance for
life with the trial judge."' Id. (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977)). In
Alabama, however, there had been only five instances where the judge had rejected an
advisory death verdict. Id. In contrast, Alabama had 47 impositions of a death sentence
over a jury recommendation of life. Id.
224. Id. at 1036.
225. Id.
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was not the number of actual death sentences, but "whether the penalties imposed [were] the product of properly guided discretion and
not of arbitrary whim." 6 In this respect, the Court again deferred to
the state legislators: "If the Alabama Statute indeed has not had the
effect that we or its drafters had anticipated, such unintended results
would be of little constitutional consequence. An ineffectual law is for
'227
the State legislature to amend, not for us to annul.
Finally, the Court rejected Harris's contention that "apparent disparities" in the weight that various judges had given to jury verdicts in
Alabama cases established a fatal arbitrariness. 228 Harris gave as an
example the fact that the judge in her case did not specify a reason for
rejecting the jury's advice, although in another case the judge had indicated that he had given "great weight" to the recommendation. 229
According to Harris, other Alabama judges had rejected jury verdicts
purportedly because there was a "reasonable basis" to do so or because the verdict was "unquestionably bizarre." 0 Harris, in fact,
quoted one judge verbatim as saying, "'if this were not a proper case
for the death
penalty to be imposed, a proper case could scarcely be
imagined. ,,,231
The Supreme Court, however, could not abide by Harris's reading of such variegated judicial standards as illustrative of how judges
"have divergent understandings of the statutory requirement that the
jury verdicts be considered. '' 2 The Court instead characterized them
as conversely proving how judges obeyed the statutory command by
"consider[ing]" jury advice.3 3
In summing up, the Court said that because the "Constitution
permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence," it
surely is not "offended when a State further requires the sentencing
judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give
it the proper weight."'
In essence, the Harris Court equated the
judge as sole capital sentencer with the judge as capital jury overrider.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1036-37; see State v. Coral, 629 So. 2d 988, 995 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
See Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. The Dissent
In his lone dissent, Justice Stevens stated that, even if he had
wholeheartedly embraced the reasoning in Spaziano, he would still
deem "the complete absence of standards to guide the judge's consid235
eration of the jury's verdict" to be constitutionally invalid.
First, as Justice Stevens advocated, the Court's "opinions have repeatedly emphasized that death is a fundamentally different kind of
penalty from any other that society may impose. '236 That is, a capital
sentence's "principal justification ...

is retribution" and "expresses

the community's judgment that no lesser sanction will provide an ade237
quate response to the defendant's outrageous affront to humanity."
As such, the jury'23verdict
is what best "reflect[s] the considered view of
8
the community.
Second, Justice Stevens, analogizing the issue before the Court to
what endures as a well-settled taboo-"judges ...

determin[ing] the

guilt or innocence of an accused without her consent"-concluded
that that very prohibition should likewise apply to "life-or-death sentencing decisions. 239 In this respect, Justice Stevens elaborated on
the danger that judges may be too susceptible to the "political climate," which can coerce them into "constantly profess[ing] their fealty to the death penalty." 40
Third, in Justice Stevens's view, the advisory nature of the jury
verdict can make matters worse. As Justice Stevens stated, "[i]f Alabama's statute expressly provided for a death sentence upon a verdict
by either the jury or the judge,.., it would violate the Constitution's
command that no defendant 'be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.'" 2 41 Justice Stevens, condemning the Alabama scheme as having this very double jeopardy effect, explained:
Alabama trial judges almost always adopt jury verdicts recommending death; a prosecutor who wins before the jury can be
confident that the defendant will receive a death sentence. A
prosecutor who loses before the jury gets a second, fresh opportunity to secure a death sentence. She may present the judge
235. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1039. According to Justice Stevens, "our jury system provides reliable insulation against the passions of the polity. Voting for a political candidate who vows to be
'tough on crime' differs vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual trial to condemn a
specific individual to death." Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1040 (quoting U.S. CON sT. amend. V).
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with exactly the same evidence and arguments that the jury rejected. The defendant's life is twice put in jeopardy, once before
the jury and again in the repeat performance before a different,
and likely less sympathetic, decisionmaker. 2
Fourth, Justice Stevens asserted "[d]eath sentences imposed by
judges over contrary jury verdicts do more than countermand the
community's judgment."'- 43 Instead, such overrides actually "express
contempt for that judgment."'
Specifically, Justice Stevens's concern was that by allowing a "lone government official's decree" to
prompt an execution can "undermine respect for the value of human
life itself and unwittingly increase tolerance of killing."'' 45
Fifth, Justice Stevens endorsed a reading of Spaziano as the
Court's recognition that "a jury override scheme is unconstitutional
without Tedder.''

46

Also, as Justice Stevens pointed out, "[t]he Spazi-

ano Court held that the rejection of capital jury sentencing by all but
seven States, and of capital jury overrides by all but (at that time)
three, did not demonstrate an 'evolving standard' disfavoring overrides."'247 According to Justice Stevens, what would harmonize Spaziano is a conclusion that the anomaly of Alabama's standardless
override scheme should signify an unequivocal and already evolved
disfavor. In summing up, Justice Stevens said that "[t]o permit the
state to execute a woman in spite of the community's considered judgment that she should not die is to sever the death penalty from its only
legitimate mooring."'m
B. The Excised Tympanic Membrane, the Augmented Death Bias and
the Annihilation of the Tedder Safeguard
In Harris, the Supreme Court ratified a capital sentencing
scheme, which combines three of the most noxious attributes: the augmentation of death bias, the annihilation of the sole Tedder safeguard,
and the excision of the tympanic membrane. First, the Alabama capital sentencing procedure spawns not just the death bias that the Court
feared in Caldwell, but an augmented death bias. In concluding that
"it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1042.
Id. (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463-64 (1984)).
Id. at 1042-43.
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responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's
death rests elsewhere," the Caldwell Court recognized the dangers inherent in the perceived delegatee being an appellate tribunal. 24 9 According to the Caldwell Court, the "institutional limits on what an
appellate court can do" combined with a jury's likely inability to fully
appreciate such limits may "not simply postpone the defendant's right
to a fair determination of the appropriateness of his death," but actually deprive the defendant of that right.250 A Caldwell jury, afflicted
with the notion that it can shift the enormous responsibility to the
appellate court, ends up delegating the life-or-death decision to a tribunal "wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in
the first instance" and bound to review sentencing determinations
with a "presumption of correctness."' 51
While, as addressed above, Florida's capital sentencing procedure
presents even more dangers than the situation in Caldwell, Alabama's
scheme is considerably worse than Florida's. As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Harris,an important difference between Florida and
Alabama is that Alabama requires only that the judge "consider" the
jury's recommendation. 252 Moreover, Alabama courts have refused to
read the Tedder standard into the statute.2 3 Although the mere "consider" requirement means that the Alabama sentencing judge, unlike
the appellate court in Caldwell or the Tedder judge in Florida, is relatively free to reject jury advice; in practice, such a rejection rarely occurs when the advice is death.25 4 The Harris Court actually focused
on this fact:
We have observed in the Florida context that permitting the trial
judge to reject the jury's advisory verdict may afford capital defendants "a second chance for life with the trial judge."

. .

. In

practice, however, Alabama's sentencing scheme has yielded
some ostensibly surprising statistics. According to the Alabama
Prison Project, there have been only 5 cases in which the judge
rejected an advisory verdict of death, compared to 47 instances
where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life7ll
Consequently, the Alabama advisory jury may-just like a Caldwell jury-pronounce death out of desire to delegate responsibility.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330-31.
Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1034 (1995).
Id
Id. at 1036.
Id. (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977)).
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Also, although the supposed Alabama delegatee is not "wholly illsuited to evaluate the appropriateness of death" in the first instance, 2 6 he or she is actually present to weigh evidence, evaluate witness credibility, and not bound to give that jury advice "great
weight"' 7 or a "presumption of correctness" 8 ; the "ostensibly surprising statistics"2 59 disclose that such delegation is perhaps more dangerously misleading than that in Caldwell.260 Specifically, the putative
delegatee will rarely veer from jury death advice. Therefore, in Alabama, as in the Caldwell situation, "[t]he 'delegation' of sentencing
responsibility ... would thus not simply postpone the defendant's
right to a fair determination of the appropriateness of26death[,
but]
1
rather... would deprive [the defendant] of that right."
What especially disturbed the Caldwell Court was that the delegatory sentence can bring about death without a sentencer actually
having determined whether death is the appropriate sentence. 262 In
the Caldwell situation or in Florida, which at the moment still has a
Tedder safeguard, there is a possibility that the fatal delegatory sentence will not issue. Conceivably, some Caldwell or Florida juries harbor an accurate awareness of the limits on what the putative delegatee
can do.26 3 Such an awareness can, at least in some instances, infiltrate

the jury's deliberative process and prevent the death sentence from
springing wholly from the jury's desire and belief that it can delegate.
Consequently, in the Caldwell predicament or a Tedder jurisdiction, a
chance that the jurors do grasp the constraints on the supposed delegatee can constitute a hope of some adulteration of the purely delegatory impulse.
While Alabama has all of the dangers inherent in a Caldwell scenario or Tedder state, it lacks that one ray of hope. An Alabama jury,
having the knowledge that the judge will merely "consider" its advice
and need not give it "great weight," faces no possible impediment to
256. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985) (emphasis added).
257. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
258. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 331.
259. Harris,115 S. Ct. at 1036.
260. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336. Even if we look only myopically at the language in
decisions in the wake of Caldwell that purport to limit the Caldwell rule to "misleading"
the jury in such a way as to diminish its sense of responsibility for capital sentencing, see
supra note 105 and accompanying text, then Alabama's scheme still violates the Caldwell
principles. That is, the Alabama jury believes it is issuing a delegatory death sentence
when, in practice, jury death will almost always be judicially affirmed.
261. Il at 330.
262. Id.

263. See id.
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an act of pure delegation. Stated otherwise, the Alabama judge as
delegatee is not an illusion, but a reality. Thus, the happenstance of a
jury actually grasping the meaning or legal effect of the word "consider" will not chill but will actually promote an act of pure
delegation.
Other aspects of the Caldwell situation, which the Supreme Court
believed were capable of creating a death-biased jury, were even more
potent in the capital sentencing scheme before the HarrisCourt. Specifically, the Caldwell Court feared "[e]ven when a sentencing jury is
unconvinced that death is the appropriate punishment, it might nevertheless wish to 'send a message' of extreme disapproval for the defendant's acts." 2" As the Court viewed it, the jury's belief that "it can
more freely 'err because the error may be corrected on appeal,"'
smoothes the way for such a send-a-message death sentence. 265 As
discussed above, when the perceived corrector is the Alabama judge
right there in the room, sending a message in the form of death advice
is even easier: in the mind of the jury, the fix will be immediate, and
because the Alabama judge will only "consider" their verdict, there
are perceivably few or no obstacles to a quick judicial fix.
Also, the Caldwell Court opined that "[i]f the jury understands
that only a death sentence will be reviewed, it will also understand
that any decision to 'delegate' responsibility for sentencing can be effectuated by returning that sentence. '266 Alabama's capital sentencing procedure most effectively encourages the imposition of death
"based on a factor wholly irrelevant to legitimate sentencing
267
concerns."
If an Alabama judge ultimately sentences the defendant to death,
an appellate court automatically reviews the conviction and sentence. 268 Upon affirmance, the Alabama Supreme Court grants certiorari as a matter of right.2 69 Consequently, an Alabama jury,
understanding that death paves the way to appellate review, will already have some leaning toward a death recommendation. A countervailing factor, however, can in some instances be a jury's sense of
discomfort about recommending death for the sole purpose of securing reviewability. Such a jury sentiment, even one adrift on some sub264. Id. at 331.
265. Id. (quoting Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
266. Id. at 332.

267. Id.
268. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994).
269. Id. § 13A-5-53(b).
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liminal deliberative plane, can potentially counteract the impulse to
sentence for the purpose of delegation.
Alabama's sentencing scheme actually eliminates that potential
antidote to a jury's predilection to impose a death sentence "out of a
desire to avoid responsibility."2 70 A jury, understanding the judge can
impose life if he or she finds that the jury had an illegitimate basis for
advising death, can go for the death sentence without the slightest
qualm. For an Alabama jury, it is a "win-win" proposition: their judicially-approved death advice secures the comfort of appellate review
while the presence of the immediate corrector alleviates any potential
trace of discomfort that their purely delegatory death sentence can
create. Thus, while Alabama's sentencing procedures present all the
"intolerable" dangers the Caldwell Court attributed to a sense of diminished responsibility, it also purges the process of potential tempering mechanisms.
Further, the Caldwell Court reasoned when jurors, who are
"placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very
difficult and uncomfortable choice" and know that the real decisionmakers will be the justices of the state supreme court, "will be
tempted to view these respected legal authorities as having more of a
'right' to make such an important decision than has the jury."271 The
fact, however, that the Alabama corrector is, as Professor Mello has
described it, the very judge that the jurors have come to know and
respect throughout the trial, 272 compounds the harm. In the course of
the trial, the judge-in a robe, commanding obedience, ruling on objections, and seemingly endowed with all the answers-undergoes real
deification. Trusting that parental deity, jurors are tempted to delegate more to that figure than to the faceless delegatees on the higher
2 73

courts.

Although the Alabama scheme augments the "intolerable dangers" that the Caldwell Court described, the Harris Court does not
deal with the issue of potential death bias on the part of an Alabama
advisory jury. Conceivably, the Court's silence in this regard is due to
its conviction that its decisions in the wake of Caldwell have lowered
Caldwell into an abyss of nonviability.2 74 Such silence, however, more
likely derives from the Court's implicit notion that, because Harris
270. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332 (1985).
271. Id. at 333.

272. See Mello, supra note 26, at 298.
273. See id.
274. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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involved a jury that actually recommended life, the whole issue of jury
death bias is irrelevant.
It is, in part, this failure to grapple with Caldwell as a fair analogue, or to identify the role of augmented death bias in the workings
of such a jury override scheme, which renders the Harris reasoning
disturbingly glib. As discussed above, if such a jury override scheme
creates an augmentedly death-biased jury, then the jury's recommendation of life is highly improbable. Louise Harris, with witnesses "attest[ing] to her good background and strong character" and her
"crearing several children, h[olding] three jobs simultaneously, and
participat[ing] actively in her church," 275 managed somehow to make
it through the augmentedly death-biased battle field intact. Louise
Harris, in winning life by a seven to five vote, had to have, in effect,
rebutted that nearly irrebuttable presumption in favor of death.
When the sentencing judge rejected this extreme life advice, he effectually ensured for Louise Harris what the Caldwell Court feared as a
mere possibility-an execution unsupported by a founded determination that death was the appropriate punishment for the individual
defendant.
Second, the Harris decision explicitly annihilates the sole safeguard of the Tedder standard. What makes such demise especially
noxious is that it compounds the damage an augmentedly death-biased procedure already spawns. When under an override scheme such
as that in Alabama, an advisory jury decides that life is the appropriate verdict, then, as stated earlier, life has to be overwhelmingly appropriate. It is only a Tedder-like standard, which requires trial judges
to accord "great weight" to the jury's recommendation, and prohibits
them from overriding the advisory life verdict, unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death... [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ,"'276 that prevents the arbitrary
demolition of the extreme life verdict and its wholly arbitrary replacement with death.
In determining that Tedder is not a constitutional requisite and
the Eighth Amendment does not require the sentencing judge 277
to
ascribe "any particular weight to the verdict of an advisory jury,"
the Harris Court disingenuously retreats from its earlier consistent
elevation of the Tedder standard as the "crucial protection"2 78 for cap275.
276.
277.
278.

Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1995).
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
Harris,115 S. Ct. at 1034.
Id. at 1035 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977)).
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ital defendants. In an ostensible effort to downplay its praise of the
Florida Supreme Court for "tak[ing the Tedder] ... standard seriously
... and not hesitat[ing] to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's
role,"2 79 the Court demotes such language to something beneath dicta.
A most disquieting repugnancy, of course, is between the Court's
refusal to deem the Tedder standard a constitutional requisite and its
denomination of the "hallmark of the analysis" as "whether the
scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results."'2 80 Specifically, in an augmentedly death-biased system, the judicial override of the jury life verdict is most likely
arbitrary.
Further, the Court's alignment of its rejection of a Tedder or Tedder-like requisite with its other decisions, in which it putatively dedlined to intrude on legislative choice, is similarly misguided. As the
Court saw it, Harris's position was not only like one it had previously
rejected-" 'a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required"' 281-but also inconsistent with its well-settled corollary that
the Constitution does not require that a state ascribe any specific
weight to particular factors to be considered by the sentencer. 2s
Such a relegation of the Tedder safeguard issue to some general
category of the balancing and weighing of mitigators and aggravators
is inappropriate. Specifically, the balancing and weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors can be components of the purposeful inexactitude built into the deliberative process, one designed to subsume
feelings that compel mercy or even some residual or lingering
doubt.283 Concededly, such an elusive process can defy containment
in one legislatively imposed structure of specifics and particulars. A
Tedder standard, however, is not of that genre. It does not involve the
assignment of weights and balancing methods in the mix of deliberative factors. What Tedder does is guarantee some respect for the
product that emerges from jury deliberation and serves to prevent the
arbitrary judicial veto of the jury's decisionmaking process.
If the Court's rationale for not requiring the specification of
methods for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors, or the attachment of specific weights to particular factors protecting the delib279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

IaL (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984)).
Id
Id (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988)).
Id.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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erative process, 284 then the Court's eradication of Tedder is glaringly

contradictory. That is, in an override system it is the Tedder standard
that can heed the sanctity of that decisionmaking process by safekeeping the verdict itself. Thus, the HarrisCourt's simultaneous preservation of legislative leeway in the context of weighing and balancing,
and its obliteration of the very standard that secures the outcome of
all that weighing and balancing, is self-defeating.
In addition, to evoke the language of Justice Stevens's dissent, the
jury override scheme without Tedder has "perverse" double jeopardy
consequences. 2 85 In a standardless override system, a jury life verdict
can be almost as if it never happened. The prosecutor, who "may
present the judge with exactly the same evidence and arguments that
the jury rejected," has a better shot at death before the "likely less
sympathetic decisionmaker."' 6 Because the jury life verdict can be
almost as if it never happened, the override scheme without Tedder,
"devolve[s] into a procedure that requires the defendant to stave off a
death sentence at each of two de novo hearings. '' 287 How can anything more literally put a Louise Harris twice in jeopardy of life?
Third, not only does the HarrisCourt annihilate the Tedder standard in precisely the situation in which it is most needed, but also
promotes the excision of the tympanic membrane. The determinative
slice comes in the form of the Court's seductive non sequitur: "The
Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital
sentence[; i]t is thus not offended when a State further requires the
sentencing judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the
judge to give it the proper weight." 8 One problem is that a judge
imposing death after a jury returns a life verdict exacerbates what is
already inherent in the death penalty-the denigration of human
life-and thus, is surely not the same as a judge acting alone.
An override scheme such as Alabama's derogates the role of the
jury and, as Justice Stevens pointed out, "aggravates the very dangers
[the death penalty] was intended to deter."2 9 According to his dissent, overrides sacrifice the legitimacy of jury verdicts at potentially
great costs. 2 90 Because of the perceivedly honored status of the jury,
the public presumes that a death sentence imposed by a jury reflects
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Harris, 115 S.Ct. at 1035.
Id. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
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the community's judgment that death is the appropriate response to
the crime.2 ' In contrast, however, "the same presumption does not
attach to a lone government official's decree."292 For, as Justice Stevens viewed it, such "government-sanctioned executions unsupported
by judgments of a fair cross-section of the citizenry may undermine
respect for the value of human life itself and unwittingly increase tolerance of killing."2 93
This increased tolerance of killing also is a product of the override's disparagement of the capital sentencing hearing. A capital defendant's story can, of course, literally mean life or death. It can be
the mercy-producing, communicative bridge from the defense table to
the "black box. '2 94 The sentencing phase of a capital trial is, in fact,
designed to be the place where the accused's voice is less subject to
295
falsification and diminution.
In making its life or death determination, the capital sentencer
must be allowed to consider all sorts of mitigating circumstances. As
the Supreme Court has held, the "consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense [is] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. '296 That capital sentencing phase as the
procedural conduit for transmitting defense noises to the jury is so
crucial that the state legislatures may not even circumscribe the
mitigators.297
The capital sentencing hearing can, of course, be quite time-consuming and stressful for the jurors. When a judge can simply discard a
life recommendation, which is the fruit of the sentencing jury's labor,
the message is one that shrivels not just the fruit but the labor itself.
In a Tedder jurisdiction, the judicial rejection of life advice literally
brands a particular jury's decision as unreasonable.298 A sentencing
scheme, such as the one in Harris,however, constitutes a blanket legislative pronunciation that all juries mean little as participants in capital sentencing and their decisions should carry little or no weight.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.; see also id. at 1041 n.9 ("Research has provided evidence that executions actually increase the level of violence in society.").
294. See Higginbotham, supra note 40, at 1051.
295. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
296. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also supra note 59.
297. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
298. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 5, at 204 ("Under Tedder, if a judge overrides a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge is not-so-implicitly stating that the
jury is not composed of 'reasonable people."').
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Thus, the Tedder-less scheme more broadly indicts the whole capital
jury sentencing system.
While the override of any jury verdict transforms the jury sentencing hearing into an ersatz proceeding, the judge's replacement of
life with death deflates the main thrust of the hearing and the role of
the defense narrative. The whole process, one which emphasizes
sending mitigators to the intended auditory organ-the tympanic
membrane-becomes for the overridden jury a time-wasting exercise
in futility. As such, the message of such an override procedure is essentially tripled. First, it expresses contempt for the community's
judgment.299 Second, it hurls that same contempt at the very process
whereby the sentencing jury arrives at its judgment. Third, it increases contempt for human life. In other words, the override's effectual relegation of the life or death story telling process to the category
of sham conterminously brands life itself as a sham.
The excision of the tympanic membrane breeds a species of murder, and not just in the form of a "government-sanctioned execution"
of a Louise Harris.3" There is also homicide in the statutorily sanctioned derision of the very process that the individualized Louise Harris story obtained for Louise Harris her jury life verdict. The broader
impartation is that life is simply unimportant. The Harris decision,
thus, with its rejection of the Tedder safeguard in an augmentedly
death-biased context, and with its approval of the excision of the tympanic membrane, fosters a view that human life is trivial.
Conclusion
The capital sentencing procedure ratified by the Harris Court
should not be dismissed as the mere equivalent of a "trial judge, acting
alone, .. . impos[ing] a capital sentence."' 30 1 What makes such an
override scheme more dangerous than a death penalty issuing from a
lone sentencer is its tendency to create an augmented death bias on
the part of the jury while simultaneously eliminating the one safeguard that can conceivably accord some deference to a jury's life
verdict.
The Alabama statute irresistibly entices an advisory jury into delegating responsibility through a death recommendation. An Alabama
jury wishing only to send a message of its disapproval of the defendant's conduct can do so freely because the judge, the one it has grown
299. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 1041 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1037.
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to trust,30 is right there ready to deliver a nearly instant fix. Where
there is pure incentive to ensure appellate review that propels a jury
to issue a death verdict, the advisory jury can do so without the slightest misgiving. This is because the jury understands that their deified
judge can almost immediately correct a result with an illegitimate underlying basis.
Also, in Alabama, the fact that the putative delegatee will rarely
reject death advice makes the sense of diminished responsibility misleading and the procedure noxious. That is, as the Supreme Court had
feared in Caldwell, delegation does "not simply postpone the defendant's right to a fair determination of the appropriateness of death[,
3 03
but] rather ...deprive[s the'defendant] of that right.
Further, while Alabama's capital sentencing scheme magnifies
the dangers the Court identified in Caldwell, it lacks a mechanism that
could possibly inhibit delegation. In override jurisdictions that have a
Tedder or Tedder-like standard, jurors, truly understanding that their
recommendation carries "great weight," 3" can possibly discern a
glitch in their attempt to avoid responsibility through advising death.
Alabama juries, however, likely lack any such perception that could
operate to chill attempted delegation. Specifically, an Alabama advisory jury, unaware of the death-override statistics yet grasping the real
significance of its advice as something for mere judicial consideration,
can unrestrainedly return a purely delegatory death verdict.
Because of its built-in augmented death bias, a judicial override
of a jury death recommendation is quite different from judicial rejection of life advice. When a judge overrides death advice, the effect is
salutary, not just because it spares a life, but also because it compensates for a jury decision ensuing from an extreme death predilection.
When an augmentedly death-biased jury recommends life, however,
the jury's assessment has to be that life is overwhelmingly appropriate.
When judges override a life verdict, they guarantee for a capital defendant what the Caldwell Court feared was the possible outcome of a
death-biased jury-an unsupported execution.
While an override procedure with its tendency to augment death
bias is by itself devastating, which the Supreme Court approved in
Harris,the override without a Tedder or Tedder-like safeguard is compounded devastation. Specifically, the "great weight" standard for302. See generally Mello supra note 26, at 297-98; supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
303. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
304. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
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bidding a judge from rejecting jury life advice, unless the facts suggest
a sentence of death so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ, stands as the solitary protector against that
extreme life decision. Thus, the absence of Tedder not only engenders
what Justice Stevens described as "perverse" 3°5 double jeopardy consequences, but ensures and even effectually proliferates improper
executions.
Also, through validation of an override procedure without a Tedder safeguard or its functional equivalent, the Supreme Court denigrates the role of the jury and the policies underlying the Sixth
Amendment jury guarantee. Implicit in Harrisis a disregard not only
for the "conscience of the community, 3 °06 but also the very jury system that affords individual participation in democratic decisionmaking
30 7
and serves as a shield from arbitrary governmental oppression.
Additionally, the impact of the Harris decision on the tympanic
membrane is most unsettling. As explained above, in capital sentencing, the jury functions as the intended recipient of the defendant's mitigative life noises. When such a jury-after hearing the most
relatively unsilenced, undisplaced, and unfalsified defense soundsmakes the crucial determination and a judge simply overrides that determination, the effect is like an excision of the tympanic membrane.
In Harris, the Supreme Court encourages such an excision.
While concededly a judicial rejection of a jury death verdict is
also an excision of the tympanic membrane and a disparagement of
the jury's part in the capital sentencing process, an override serving to
spare a life or err in favor of life is saliently different from an override
that results in the single-handed imposition of death. 30 8 Specifically,
when the excision of the tympanic membrane ends up with a judicial
jettison of jury life advice, its impact has to be what Justice Stevens
envisioned as the "undermine[d] respect for the value of human life
305. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. See supra note 26; see also supra notes 34, 44-46 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 36-39, 47-48, 71-74.
308. The Florida Supreme Court has stated the Tedder standard also applies to jury
death recommendations. See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839 n.1 (Fla. 1988);
LeDuc v. State, 365 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1978); see also Radelet & Mello, supra note 5, at
206 (quoting Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 960 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A]bolishing the Florida
judge's power to override a jury's life recommendation, but not the power to override a
death recommendation, would create an asymmetry. But it would be an 'an asymmetry
weighted on the side of mercy."')), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). Radelet and Mello
also argue that the judicial overriding of death recommendations has certain "pragmatic
benefits"-like allowing for an "early and efficient means to filter out cases for which the
death penalty is inappropriate." Radelet & Mello, supra note 5, at 208-09.
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and unwittingly increase[d] tolerance of killing."30 9 That devastation
is not just due to the public presumption "that a death sentence imposed by a jury reflects the community's judgment that death is the
appropriate response to the defendant's crime," one which "does not
attach to a lone government official's decree."31 0 It also derives from
the override's effectual degradation of the very life or death hearing
and disdain for the jury labor that went into the process of arriving at
a life verdict. What an override of a jury life verdict uniquely does is
trivialize the very product of the enterprise.
It is, of course, even more degrading when that judicial obliteration of life can take place without the necessity of a controlling standard. One of the messages arising from the now judicially condoned
standardless override is that the shift from life to death is insignificant,
and thus an event not worthy of submission to the contours of any real
circumspection or governance. If, as Justice Brandeis once admonished, "[g]overnment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher, ' 311 then
the Supreme Court's governmental sanctioning of what can be a single-handed and cavalier death blow does not merely teach, but, in
fact, dignifies the act of killing. In truth, the Harris decision constitutes the Supreme Court's apotheosis of governmental murder.
This Article began with Sir Walter Ralegh's attempts to parse
pain with his sonnet, "To His Son. '312 Through his dissection of an
execution into its veritable components, the poet arrives at the "rotting" and "fretting" and "choking" qualities of the whole.313 Had the
Supreme Court in Harris analyzed the statutory death scheme with
only some of that poetic precision, it would have declined to approve
the consummate assemblage of three things that are quite "rotting"
and "fretting" and "choking" unto themselves: an augmented death
bias, a standardless override, and an excision of the tympanic
membrane.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1041 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Ild.

